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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
HARRY THORSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARKAY JOHNSON, et al. , 
Defendants. 
GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, et al. , 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HARRY THORSEN and DONALD GATES, 
Defendants. 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-
2(i) and Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final Order and Judgment entered by 
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APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 880402 
the Honorable Don V, Tibbs of the Sixth Judicial District Court 
for the State of Utah. The Court's Order was entered after an 
initial appeal to this Court, in which this Court remanded to 
the District Court for re-assessment of damages. The judgment 
giving risa to this appeal is from the Order and Judgment entered 
by the Sixth Judicial District Court adjudicating the rights and 
obligations of the parties after re-assessment of damages. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. m light of the evidence before the Trial Court, did the 
Court improperly value the property damaged. 
2. Given the evidence before the Trial Court/ did the Trial 
Court improperly determine the size of the property damaged^ 
DETERMINATIVE CASE LAW 
There are no rules, statutes or ordinances which are 
determinative of the issues. However, this same matter has been 
before the Supreme Court prior to remand to the District Court 
and is recorded at Thorsen vs. Johnson, 745 P. 2d 1243 (Utah 
1987). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On the 4th day of March, 1981, Plaintiffs Gooseberry's 
Estate, et al. [hereinafter referred to as Gooseberry] served 
upon Defendants Thorsen, et al. [hereinafter referred to as 
Thorsen] a Summons and Complaint (R. 6) alleging that Thorsen had 
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exceeded his right to come upon Gooseberry's property and clean 
an irrigation ditch which provided water to the Thorsenfs 
property (R. 1-5). The ditch which gives rise to these 
proceedings is part of an irrigation system called the Gooseberry 
Creek Irrigation System which was established before the turn of 
the century and according to the Cox Decree (1933) (Tr. 458). 
The shareholders are serviced by three principle diversions from 
the creek known as the "A Ditch Section," MB Ditch Section" and 
"C Ditch Section" (Exhibit 21). Historically, that is from 1880, 
the original ditch for the B Ditch Section has been referred to 
as the "lower ditch". For one hundred years, this original "B" 
ditch served the Thorsen property (T. 461). 
The extension ditch was a diversion from the original ditch 
and in effect, split the "B" ditch. There is some confusion in 
the record whether the lower original route or the higher 
extension route is the "B" ditch. For purposes of clarity, the 
original "B" ditch is referred to herein as the "lower B ditch" 
and the extension ditch is referred to as the "upper B ditch". 
The "lower B ditch" is the subject of this action. Exhibit No. 
22 shows the location of the ditches and properties.) 
On the 31st day of August 1982, Judge Tibbs, ruling from the 
bench, determined that Harry Thorsen was liable to Gooseberry 
Estates for damage caused to Gooseberry's property when a ditch 
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(lower B ditch) was cleaned by Thorsen (T. 563. See also 
Addendum B, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment). 
In ruling, Judge Tibbs awarded to Gooseberry Estates $54,000.00 
(Addendum B). Gooseberry, however, candidly admitted at oral 
argument before this Court on the first appeal that Thorsen had 
an easement for the ditch which had been cleaned (See Addendum 
C, Court's Opinion on First Appeal). The judgment for $54,000.00 
was arrived at based upon the testimony of Gooseberry's 
appraiser, Ken Esplin, who stated that the lots were worth 
$12,000.00 which had been damaged by 50% (Addendum D, Appraisal 
of Ken Esplin; T. 323). The $12,000.00 figure per lot was 
arrived at by Gooseberry's appraiser by valuing the property as a 
completed subdivision (T. 323). The trial court found that nine 
lots had been damaged by 50% (Addendum B). 
Defendant Harry Thorsen appealed the decision of the 
District Court (Addendum C). This Court determined that it was 
inappropriate for the measure of damages to be calculated as a 
completed subdivision, but rather, the appropriate measure of 
damages to the property would be determined by the difference in 
market value of the property before and after the injury 
(Addendum C). The Utah Supreme Court then remanded the case back 
to the District Court for re-assessment of damages (Addendum C). 
As per the opinion of this Court on the first appeal, several 
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issues and factual determinations pertinent to the matter at hand 
were resolved as follows: 
(a) That counsel for Gooseberry admitted at oral 
argument of the case before the Supreme Court that the 
Trial Court did not find an abandonment and that 
Thorsen had an easement through Gooseberry's land for 
the ditch (Thorsen vs. Johnson, 745 P.2d 1243, 1244 
(1987), Addendum C). 
(b) That Thorsen exceeded his right to enter upon 
Gooseberry's land and to clean the ditch (Thorsen at 
1244, Addendum C). 
(c) That the appropriate measure of damages for entry 
upon real property is the difference between the value 
of the property immediately before and immediately 
after the injury (Thorsen, at 1244-45, Addendum C). 
(d) That the $6,000.00 per lot damage found by the 
lower court was based upon the testimony given by 
Kenneth Esplin, that if and when the subdivision was 
approved and recorded, water was made available and 
the improvements were in place, the lots would sell 
for $12,000.00 each. He opined that ten of the 
proposed lots were damaged so as to reduce their 
potential value by 50% or $6,0000.00 each (Thorsen, at 
1245, Addendum C). 
(e) That this Court determined that it was 
inappropriate to view the Gooseberry land as a 
completed subdivision and that in fact, the 
appropriate measure of damages, was the diminution of 
the fair market value of the property immediately 
following the infliction of the damage, not what the 
property may be worth when and if substantial sums of 
money were expended to turn it into an improved 
subdivision (Thorsen, at 1246, Addendum C). 
(f) The Court determined that both parties had agreed 
that the fair market value of the raw land in its 
pristine state prior to the digging of the ditch in 
question was worth $1,250.00 per acre (Thorsen, at 
1246, Addendum C). 
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(g) That the nine lots which the District Court 
determined were completely destroyed was inappropriate 
and contrary to the evidence given by Esplin when he 
testified that the ditch was diminished by the value 
of 50% as opposed to being totally destroyed (Thorsen, 
at 1246, Addendum C). 
(h) That the ditch widened and deepened by Thorsen 
was 15 feet wide and 3,150 feet long comprising a 
total acreage of 1.08 acres, which would be maximum 
land which could have been totally destroyed assuming 
contrary to the admission of Gooseberry's counsel that 
Thorsen had no right to an easement (Thorsen, at 1247, 
Addendum C). 
(i) In short, the Court determined that the ruling of 
the District Court and the analysis of Gooseberry 
Estate's appraiser was flawed in two respects, in that 
"there was no evidence that the 'lots' had a fair 
market value of $6,000.00 before Thorsen enlarged the 
ditch and there was no evidence that the ditch totally 
destroyed nine lots. (Thorsen at 1245, Addendum B) 
Pursuant to the original judgment entered by Judge Tibbs in 
August of 1982, the Court specifically determined that nine lots 
out of 33 lots in the proposed subdivision had been damaged 
(Addendum B). The original judgment did not mention or refer to 
any of the lots other than the nine lots referred to by the Judge 
Tibbs in the decision (Addendum B). The Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment drafted by counsel for 
Gooseberry Estates specifically finds: 
The Court finds that there are nine (9) lots which 
were totally destroyed and the Court fixes the value 
of $6,000.00 in their condition at the time of the 
aforesaid advance and not in the condition they would 
have become upon final development, but rather upon 
the basis of improvements done upon these lots up to 
the time the defendant . . . . (Addendum B) 
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In addition to the District Court finding that only 9 lots 
were damaged, this Court, in its decision on the first appeal, 
considered only the appropriateness of the damage to the area 
contained in nine lots (Addendum C). 
As it relates to the size and value of the damaged property, 
Ken Esplin, appraiser for Gooseberry Estates testified at trial: 
This shows what the potential value of these lots 
is. Using that and the fact that these are a little 
larger and I think there will be more of a demand for 
them near Salina than east of Fairview, I place the 
value on this property, an average value of 
$12,000.00 per lot when improvements are in place and 
this multiplied by the 33 lots comes up to 
$448,656.00. 
Now after taking into consideration the canal that 
has gone through there, I feel that there are ten 
lots that are badly damaged, there are some others 
that are damaged, but ten of the lots are very badly 
damaged. I think they have decreased in value by 50% 
or $6,000.00 per lot for a diminution because of that 
canal at $60,000.00, leaving an after value of 
$388,656.00. (T. 323) (Emphasis added). 
At trial, Ken Esplin also testified on behalf of Gooseberry 
Estates as follows: 
Q: In your letter addressed to Ken in the first 
paragraph, don't you say that you are doing it on the 
basis of nine lots that were damaged? 
A. Well that's a typographical error. If it says 
nine, it is the ten lots that were damaged. 
Q. Ten lots that were damaged? 
A. Yes, definitely. In fact, there are about 15 that 
are damaged. I figure that 10 of the 15 or 16 that 
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were damaged severely enough to be damaged by 50% and 
they're the only ones I have drawn attention to. 
There are several reasons for that: 
There are two of those lots that already have enough 
impairment with the power lines running over them that 
they were damaged down to that figure before and I 
haven't given any value to that. There are reasons 
why I only use instead of the total number that the 
canal goes through. (T. 330) 
The only place in which appraiser Ken Esplin, testifying on 
behalf of Gooseberry Estates at trial, places a value on any of 
the land other than the $12,000.00 per lot is his answer when 
questioned what the value of the meadow or raw land was worth 
that would not be subdivided, Ken Esplin testified: 
The per acre value of the remainder comes out 
slightly under $1,200.00 per acre as agricultural 
land. (Emphasis added) (T. 335) 
At trial, appraiser Esplin, on behalf of Gooseberry, 
submitted as Exhibit 33 (Addendum D) an appraisal report on 
Gooseberry Estates in which in his introductory letter, he 
expresses that his appraisal is based upon his opinion of 
diminution of value of 9 lots in Gooseberry Estates caused by the 
canal through these lots (Addendum D, Appraisal of Ken Esplin). 
At page 6 of Ken Esplin's appraisal Mr. Esplin identifies that 
the damage caused by the ditch amounted to ten lots damaged at 
50% for a total of $60,000.00 (Addendum D, Appraisal of Ken 
Esplin.) 
Joseph F. Stott, appraiser called on behalf of Thorsen, 
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stated that the best use of the property would be for subdivision 
purposes and that the property in an unimproved state prior to 
the digging of the ditch based upon similar sales of unimproved 
subdivision property in the area would total $1,250.00 per acre: 
A: Yes, as contained in the appraisal, I have 
indicated that the irrigations do not effect the 
market value of property; however, to clean such 
ditches has no measurable value or effect on the 
market value. Each sale is considered as to time, 
location, physical characteristics, and condition of 
sale based on the market conditions. It is my opinion 
that the market value of the subject property is 
$1,250.00 per acre. 
Q. And you reduce your appraisal work to a report. 
A. Yes. 
Q* Have you reduced your appraisal into a written 
report. 
A. Yes I have. 
Q. And. . . . 
The Court: Let me just ask a question so I understand 
your last answer. Are you saying that, in your 
opinion, this ditch does not make any difference one 
way or another? 
A. Well, I did not appraise it as a subdivision. I 
appraised as a 50.59 acres in an as is condition and 
through the inspection that I have made of the 
property, it is my opinion that a ditch did exist 
there and the effect of those ditches are reflected in 
the market value in comparison to other properties. 
But the cleaning of such ditches didn't. The upper 
ditch has been cleaned similar to the lower ditch. (T. 
366-367) 
On remand and Motion for Re-assessment of Damages, counsel 
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for Plaintiff and Defendant submitted Memorandums to the District 
Court and in addition, counsel for Gooseberry submitted two 
Affidavits both of which are attached as Addendum E. 
Upon Motion for Re-assessment, the District Court determined 
that instead of 9 lots being damaged as found by the very same 
District Court at the time of trial, that upon re-assessment of 
damages that not only were 9 lots damaged but also the remaining 
24 lots in the proposed subdivision and awarded judgment 
therefore (See Addendum F, Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment). 
In addition to expending the area damaged, the District 
Court also determined that the 9 lots suffered such damage that 
it is totally useless for any purpose except grazing and, 
consequently, awarded $15,835.50 (Paragraph 1, Findings of Fact, 
Addendum F.) In addition, the Court some how also concluded that 
aside from the 9 lots, the additional 24 lots suffered damage to 
the extent of 50% and awarded damages for $22,950.00 (Paragraph 
2, Findings of Fact, Addendum F). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The evidence before the Court requires that in applying this 
Court's prior decision that the amount of damages should equal 
the diminution in market value before and after the injury 
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establishes that the only diminution in value of property which 
has a pre-injury value of $1,250 per acre is that portion for 
which the Court determines has been totally destroyed. 
POINT II 
The only property for which defendants are entitled to 
recover damages is that amount of property determined by the 
Court encompassed by the ditch itself minus the acreage 
encompassed by the Thorsen easement. 
ARGUMENT 
The issues raised by Harry Thorsenfs appeal can easily be 
categorized into two general categories. First, what is the 
fair market value of the property before and after the damage and 
second, what amount of property has in fact been damaged. 
INTRODUCTION 
The testimony and evidence for which the District Court and 
this Court has relied in determining the value of the property 
damaged is the testimony presented at trial and by Affidavit of 
the appraisers for the respective parties. Ken Esplin was the 
appraiser who testified for on behalf of Gooseberry Estates and 
Joseph F. Stott was the appraiser who testified for and on behalf 
of Harry Thorsen. 
The unequivocal testimony offered by Ken Esplin and for 
which the District Court relied in entering its judgment prior to 
11 
the first appeal in a nut shell established three points. First, 
that the total area damaged by the ditch encompassed ten lots. 
The Court, however, in its Findings of Fact prior to the first 
appeal specifically found that nine lots were damaged. Secondly, 
Kenneth Esplin established that the nine or ten lots had been 
damaged to the extent of 50% of their value and third, that the 
value of the lots assuming their value as a completed subdivision 
equaled $12,000.00. The formula set out by Kenneth Esplin was 
accepted entirely by the District Court as part of its Findings, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in that the Court found nine 
lots to be damaged by 50% of $12,000.00 and awarded judgment in 
the amount of $54,000.00. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court pointed out two flaws in the 
formula asserted by appraiser Esplin and accepted by the Trial 
Court: 
This analysis is flawed in two respects. There was no 
evidence that the lots had a fair market value of 
$6,000.00 before Thorsen enlarged the ditch, and there 
was no evidence that the ditch totally destroyed nine 
lots. 
Thorsen vs. Johnson, 745 P.2d 1243, 1245 (Utah 1987). 
In short, the Supreme Court found that valuing the damaged 
lots as a cpmpleted subdivision was improper and further 
specifically found that the damage to the tract of land was 
something less than total destruction of nine lots. 
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POINT I 
WHAT IS THE RELATIVE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY DAMAGE BETWEEN 
THE FAIR MARKET VALUE BEFORE THE INJURY AND THE FAIR 
MARKET VALUE AFTER THE INJURY 
As stated supra, the evidence offered at trial for which the 
Court has relied in establishing the value of the property 
damaged is the evidence supplied by the appraisers for the 
parties. With regard to the testimony and Affidavit offered by 
Ken Esplin, three critical figures have been testified to by Mr. 
Esplin. The first figure is the determination that the lots were 
worth $12,000.00 each as completed mountain subdivision lots and 
that the damage to the property resulting from the cleaning of 
the ditch resulted in a diminution of value of 50% per lot for 
ten lots. 
The second critical figure that Mr. Esplin testified to was 
that the value of the meadow which comprised the remaining tract 
of land which had not been contemplated as being subdivided into 
lots but was part of the original piece of property purchased by 
Gooseberry Estates was worth sightly under $1,200.00 per acre as 
agricultural land. The reason this figure is critical is this 
Court has found and the District Court has relied as well as the 
parties have relied upon the finding of this Court that both 
appraisers have agreed that the value of the land in an 
unimproved state is worth $1,250.00. The only testimony given by 
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Ken Esplin establishing the approximately $1,200.00 value is his 
testimony set out supra relating to the meadow as being worth 
$1,200.00 per acre for "agricultural purposes". In prior 
pleadings, counsel for Gooseberry has asserted that Mr. Esplinfs 
testimony is that the $1,250.00 per acre figure was Mr. Esplin's 
valuation of the land for use as a subdivision. As a basis for 
their assertion, they rely on the Affidavit attached as E which 
accompanied Gooseberry's Motion for Re-assessment of Damages in 
which Mr. Esplin states in paragraph 4a: 
He reiterates the testimony that the real property 
subject of litigation consisting of approximately 50.9 
acres was worth, without any improvements in the year 
1980, the sum of $1,250.00 per acre. 
The inconsistency, however, in Mr. Esplin's Affidavit is 
that no where in his testimony does he say anything about the 
property being worth $1,250.00 per acre other than the statement 
that the meadow was worth $1,200.00 per acre for agricultural 
purposes. Consequently, there is no evidence before the Trial 
Court or this Court that the $1,250.00 per acre asserted by Mr. 
Esplin was a valuation of anything other than what the property 
was worth for agricultural purposes. 
The third critical figure testified to by Ken Esplin is 
contained in his Affidavit attached to Gooseberry's Motion to 
re-assess damages. (A copy of which is attached as E. ) Ken 
Esplin's Affidavit reads in pertinent part: 
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He is of the opinion that the property's next and 
highest use after development as a subdivision or 
mountain development was, in the year 1980 and 
immediately prior to the damage done to it by 
Defendant Harry Thorsen, $100.00 per acre. He is of 
the opinion that the value of the land as of February 
20, 1988, is the sum of $50.00 per acre and that is 
the best use to which it could be devoted now or could 
have been devoted at any time after the excavation 
made by Harry Thorsen. 
The testimony offered by Joseph F. Stott, appraiser, for 
Harry Thorsen, testified that the fair market value of the 
property unimproved prior to the cleaning of the ditch was 
$1,250.00 but further, also testified that the $1,250.00 took 
into consideration the easement across the property for the ditch 
for which counsel for Gooseberry Estates has acknowledged its 
existence and the cleaning of the ditch as completed by Harry 
Thorsen does not diminish the fair market value of the property. 
The Supreme Court in its previous opinion, has clearly 
stated that the $6,000.00 figure arrived at by the appraiser for 
Gooseberry Estates was inappropriate and specifically ruled that 
the appropriate test was the diminution in market value before 
and after the injury. In determining the appropriate value of 
the property prior to the damage, this Court has found that both 
parties have agreed that the value equaled $1,250.00. The 
finding that parties have agreed on a value of $1,250.00, 
requires a determination of the underlying reasoning for the 
agreed market amount. According to the only testimony given by 
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Esplin, appraiser for Gooseberry Estates, states that the 
remainder of the property was worth slightly under $1,200.00 for 
agricultural purposes. Appraiser for Harry Thorsen testified 
that he arrived at the $1,250.00 by determining what the tract of 
land was worth in an unimproved state. It was upon those basis 
that this Court determined that the pre-injury value of the 
property was $1,250.00 per acre. 
Joseph Stott, appraiser for Harry Thorsen, placed the post-
injury value of the property at the same amount of $1,250.00 per 
acre and determined that there was no diminution in the value of 
the property as a result of the cleaning of the ditch. 
The testimony given by the appraiser for Gooseberry Estates, 
however, is somewhat ambiguous. In the Affidavit attached, which 
was submitted along with the Motion for Re-assessment of Damages, 
Ken Esplin testified that the only values pertinent to the 
property was either a valuation of the property as a 
subdivision/mountain lot development or as grazing land and 
indicated that there was nothing in between the two valuations: 
He is of the opinion that the highest and best use of 
the property prior to the excavation made thereon by 
Defendant, Harry Thorsen, was as a subdivision or 
mountain lot development. That was the highest and 
best use then and there were no other uses available 
for the land except for grazing (See paragraph 4, 
Affidavit of Ken Esplin attached as E). 
The valuation based upon the property by Ken Esplin as a 
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subdivision or mountain lot development was $12,000.00 per lot 
with ten lots damaged at 50% leaving the value of each of the ten 
lots at $6,000.00. The Supreme Court, in its opinion attached as 
C, specifically rejected said valuation in its prior opinion. 
On the other hand, Mr. Esplin testified that in terms of market 
value for grazing purposes for which he acknowledges, the only 
other alternative that the fair market value of the property was 
worth $100.00 per acre. Gooseberry Estates, as a basis for their 
Motion for Summary Disposition has alleged that the critical 
figures to look at was the $1,250.00 amount which the Court 
determined was the agreed amount prior to the damage and to 
offset said amount by the value of the land for grazing 
purposes. To do so, would allow a complete contradiction in the 
testimony of Ken Esplin who supplied the evidence for whom 
Gooseberry Estates rely. 
In other words, it is the relative values of the property 
which are critical before and after the cleaning of the ditch. 
If the Court relies on the $1,250.00 figure, it must also rely on 
the basis for which said figure was arrived. In other words, if 
Ken Esplin testifies at trial that the value of the property 
prior to the damage done by the ditch was $1,250.00 based upon 
its use for agricultural purposes, it is difficult to image, and 
there is no testimony in the record or evidence to draw a 
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conclusion, but is contrary to one's common sense if the property 
was useful for agricultural purposes before the ditch was cleaned 
how the property, after the cleaning of the ditch, could not be 
used for agricultural purposes other than that acreage 
encompassed by the ditch. Therefore, the only diminution in 
value would be the small strip of land for which the ditch 
actually encompasses. Counsel for Gooseberry in their Motion for 
Summary Disposition as well as in their Motion for Re-assessment 
of Damages asserts that Ken Esplin meant the $1,250.00 figure was 
based upon the land's value as a subdivision. However, Esplin's 
testimony does not establish that the $1,250.00 figure was based 
on anything other than the value of land for agricultural 
purposes. 
In short, the appraiser for Harry Thorsen has testified that 
the cleaning of the ditch did not diminish the value of the 
property. The appraiser for Gooseberry Estates, after setting 
out the three categories of figures arrived at, also demonstrates 
that there was only a very minimal amount of diminution of value 
in the property since this Court has rejected the valuation based 
upon subdivision lots which Esplin valued at $12,000.00. 
If the second category of figures is accepted by the Court of 
$1,250.00, one would be led to the same conclusion that if the 
property could be used for agricultural purposes prior to the 
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cleaning of the ditch, then it also could be used for 
agricultural purposes subsequent to the cleaning of the ditch. 
Likewise, assuming the difference in values of the property as 
used for grazing purposes, one would also have to conclude that 
the market value of the property prior to the damage was for 
grazing purposes as well as subsequent to the injury to the land 
and, consequently, the same conclusion is reached that Thorsen is 
only liable for the damages arising out of the acreage 
encompassed by the ditch itself with a set off of the acreage 
encompassed by the easements. 
Consequently, in light of the evidence, and the record 
before the Court, the proper resolution of this matter is to 
value the pre-injury market value of the property at $1,250.00 as 
previously found by the Court and to award damages only for that 
portion of the property which has been completely destroyed which 
the Court has determined to be, at most, 1.8 acres (3,150 feet 
long times 15 feet wide) less the area encompassed by the 
easement. (See Thorsen, at 1247.) Particularly in light of the 
fact that whether one values the pre-market value based upon its 
use as agricultural purposes or as grazing purposes, there can be 
no diminution in value other than the area actually encompassed 
by the ditch itself. 
POINT II 
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THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DETERMINED THE SIZE 
OF THE PROPERTY THAT WAS DAMAGED. 
In order for Gooseberry to establish on reassessment of 
damages that all 33 proposed lots were damaged, Gooseberry would 
have to completely impeach the testimony of their own appraiser, 
Ken Esplin, persuade the Court to over-rule a specific finding it 
had previously made [for which counsel for Gooseberry 
specifically drafted after the trial and included in its Findings 
of Fact signed by the Court] and finally carry the burden of 
persuasion on reassessment of damages to get the Court to make 
findings and enter a judgment without any additional evidence 
addressing the issue and get the Court to rule in direct 
contravention of Gooseberry's own appraiser's testimony. 
Based upon the clear and unequivocal testimony and evidence 
before the District Court, the outer limits of the property 
damaged can easily be ascertained by the testimony and evidence 
produced. Upon reassessment of damages, the District Court found 
that all 33 lots were damaged. The finding by the Court is not 
supported by the evidence and in fact, contradicts the testimony 
of the appraiser on which the Court relies. At trial, Ken 
Esplin, appraiser for Gooseberry Estates, testified as follows: 
Now after taking into consideration the canal that 
has gone through there, I feel that there are 10 lots 
that are badly damaged, there are some others that 
are damaged, but 10 of the lots are very badly 
damaged. I think that they have decreased in value 
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by 50% or $6,000 per lot for a diminution because of 
that canal at $60,000, leaving an after value of 
$338,656* (Transcript page 323, emphasis added). 
Ken Esplin also testified as it relates to the 10 lots as 
follows: 
Q: That in your letter addressed to Ken in the first 
paragraph, don't you say that you are doing it on the 
basis of nine lots that were damaged? 
A: Well, that's a topographical error. If it says 
nine, it is the ten lots that were damaged. 
Q: Ten lots that were damaged? 
A: Yes, definitely. In fact, there are about 15 
that are damaged. I figure that ten of that 15 or 16 
that were damaged severely enough to be damaged by 
50% and they are the only that I have drawn attention 
to. There are several reasons for that: 
There are two of those lots that already have 
enough impairment with the power line running over 
them, that they are damaged down to that figure 
before and I haven't given any value to that. There 
are reasons why I only use ten instead of the total 
number that the canal goes through. (Transcript, page 
330). 
The trial Court prior to the first appeal accepted the 
formula offered by Mr. Esplin in determining the amount of 
damages to award. Mr. Esplin testified that nine or ten lots 
were damaged to 50% of their value or $6,000. In so ruling, the 
Court entered a Finding of Fact which was drafted by counsel for 
Gooseberry that reads as follows: 
The Court finds that there are nine (9) lots which 
were totally destroyed and the Court fixes the value 
of $6,000 and their condition at the time of the 
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aforesaid advance and not in the condition that they 
would have become upon full development, but rather, 
upon the basis of improvements done upon these lots 
up to the time the defendant . . . (Paragraph 11 
Amended Findings of Fact, Addendum F). 
The issue of whether the damage extended to more than the 
nine lots was never appealed by Gooseberry Estates nor was it 
addressed by this Court. Further, it is clear from the opinion 
of this Court that all references to the extent of damages and 
whether the damages assessed were appropriate, related only to 
the nine lots. Specifically, this Court states in its opinion 
that there was no evidence in the record to support that nine 
lots were completely destroyed which by implication would mean 
that the damages were either less than 50% total destruction or 
that the injured property encompassed less than the nine lots but 
regardless, the Court set the outer limits of the potential 
damage to Gooseberry. 
Upon Motion for Reassessment of Damages, as one reads 
carefully the Affidavit of Ken Esplin, there is no additional 
evidence presented to the Court to even form a basis for 
778consideration of damages extending beyond the nine lots. 
The only assertion made with regard to whether the damages 
should extend outside- of the nine lots is encompassed in the 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities on Motion for Reassessment 
of Damages which was supplied by Gooseberry's counsel as part of 
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their arguments which not only fails to constitute evidence for 
which the Court can rely, but further, is directly contrary to 
the testimony of their own witness, Ken Esplin, and the Findings 
of Fact drafted by Gooseberry's counsel themselves• 
Yet, the Court in its Ruling on Reassessment of Damages, 
somehow not only awards damages for the nine lots previously 
determined to be damaged but arbitrarily awards a Judgment for 
damage to some 24 lots never before considered by the Court prior 
to reassessment of damages. 
In addition, the Court determines that the 24 lots are 
damaged to the extent of 50% of their value. The error the 
District Court has made in so ruling is that the only evidence 
before the Court as to a 50% reduction in value is specifically 
limited to the ten lots as testified to by Ken Esplin and who 
specifically testifies that the remaining 24 lots were 
undamaged. As one looks to the evidence presented to the Court 
by way of testimony and Affidavit and particularly in light of 
Gooseberry Estates1 own appraiser, the outer limit of the 
property involved or damaged would be the ten lots referred to by 
Ken Esplin, which can even be narrowed further by the Court's 
finding that the nine lots had been damaged. 
Within the confines of the nine lots which received some 
degree of damage, one must consider the extent for which the 
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Thorsens should be liable for any damage thereto. 
This Court clearly found that the Thorsens were entitled to 
an easement across the property and with any easement the 
Thorsens had the right to clean the ditch and in fact, had the 
obligation to Gooseberry to maintain the ditch to avoid water 
leaking onto the Gooseberry property, 
Thompson on Property, Easements, Section 428 (1980) states: 
An easement involves the right to repair, and this 
necessarily includes the right to go upon the land of 
the servient owner for that purpose. The nature of 
the easement determines what the dominant owner may 
do in the way of repairing his easement. Thus, where 
the servient tenement does not in its normal 
condition support the easement but artificial 
improvements are the basis of the easement the 
dominant tenement owner has the right to maintain 
those conditions, so long as such repair does not 
increase the burden or unduly interfere with the 
rights of the servient tenement. Private easements 
with right of way must be maintained by the owner of 
the dominant estate. 
. . . Also, the grantee of a right-of-way may break 
up the soil, level irregularities, fill up 
depressions, blast rocks and remove impediments . . 
If one has the right-of-way for ditch purposes, he 
has the incidental right to enter upon the premises 
for repair and maintenance at the time and places, 
and to the extent necessary. 
. . . The right-of-way for a ditch includes the right 
to maintain it, which confers the right to make 
repairs and the right of ingress and egress with 
space therefore as contingency may show. 
This Court found as set out in its opinion attached as 
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Addendum C that Thorsen's retained an easement for the ditch 
across the Gooseberry property. This Court further found, 
however, that "Thorsen greatly exceeded the mere cleaning of the 
ditch and amounted to a substantial widening and deepening of the 
ditch." (See Addendum C). Defendants' purpose in citing the 
law as it relates to easements is not to raise issue or to 
contest the finding by this Court that Thorsen exceeded his right 
to clean and maintain the ditch but rather, raises the issue for 
purposes of proximate cause. The allegations asserted by 
Gooseberry against Thorsen are in the nature of tort in that they 
have alleged Thorsen entered onto their property and willfully 
exceeded his right to maintain the easement by widening and 
deepening the ditch. 
A well accepted principle of tort law is that a defendant is 
only liable for those damages which are proximately caused by the 
defendantf s actions. 
As with any tort, the tort-feasor is not liable for every 
potential consequence resulting from his action but only damages 
which are proximately caused by his actions: 
The law is clear that a person who commits a tort is 
not liable for all of the consequences of his 
tortious activities simply because those consequences 
can be traced to his activity. One liability-
limiting principle which has been accepted by the 
Court is the doctrine of proximate cause. A 
statement frequently found in tort cases in which a 
recovery for damages is sought is that the act or 
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admission of the defendant upon which the damages are 
predicated must have been the proximate, as 
distinguished from the remote cause of injury. 
Another common statement is that damages may be 
recovered against a tort-feasor for, or only for, the 
natural, direct and proximate consequences of his 
wrongful act or admission. 
22 Am Jur. 2nd Damages Section 81. 
As per the prior opinion of this Court, it was recognized 
that Thorsen had an easement across the Gooseberry property at 
the location the ditch, which the subject of this litigation, is 
located. In accord with the authorities cited supra, Thorsen had 
a right and obligation to maintain the ditch. The fact that 
Thorsen had an easement across the property meant that at least 
in terms of the building of a subdivision on the property meant 
that the subdivision in essence would have to be built around the 
easement. Condominiums could not be built across the easement 
nor could garages be built on the ditch. Car pads could not be 
built through the ditch which would impair Thorsen!s easement. 
Fences could not be built so as to impede Thorsenfs right to use 
and maintain the ditch. 
Admittedly this Court has found that Thorsen exceeded his 
right to clean and maintain the ditch and consequently, the Court 
found that the ditch had been widened to 15 feet wide and 3,150 
feet long occupying 1.08 acres. The easement owned by Thorsen 
and recognized by the Court is contained in the 1.08 acres. 
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However, once one gets outside of the corporal physical 1.8 acres 
encompassed by the ditch, the question of any damage because one 
of proximate cause. 
The text book example frequently used is the situation in 
which a dwelling starts on fire and spreads to adjoining houses 
and the question becomes whether the guilty party is liable for 
every consequence arising from the fire or is there a some point 
in which the tort becomes to removed from the injury that it will 
be held not to have been proximately caused by the starting of 
the fire. As one expands the example with the fire from the 
immediate house to adjoining houses and then to the next row of 
houses and so on and then once the fire has been put out, are 
persons who were outside the actual fire allowed to claim smoke 
damage and those parties outside the smoke damage whether they 
can claim injury because their view of adjoining property is not 
aesthetically pleasing. The point to be made is that at some 
point a line must be drawn as to those injuries proximately 
caused by a defendant's tort. 
As is the case with a fire, a line can be drawn at the point 
in which the fire has been extinguished, so is it with the case 
at hand that the actual physical injury can be drawn by the 
parameters set by the Supreme Court of 15 feet by 3,150 feet 
minus the acreage encompassed by the easement. Once outside of 
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the 15 foot path of the ditch, the injury then becomes a question 
of aesthetics. 
Some of the facts which weigh against Gooseberry's assertion 
that this property cannot be subdivided due to the ditch is that 
the record is very clear that the same parcel of property also 
contains a second ditch referred to as the "upper B ditch" or the 
"B ditch extension" which also runs through the property which is 
similar in size for which plaintiffs recognize the subdivision 
would also have to be built around. There is a Utah Power & 
Light easement which runs perpendicular to the ditch which 
consists of large towers and transmission lines which runs 
through the property in question. In addition, the fact that 
Thorsen had the easement for the irrigation ditch would require 
any subdivision to be designed so as to not interfere with the 
ditch. 
As one considers the issue of proximate cause, a valid 
question in terms of aesthetics would be what if Thorsen had dug 
the ditch on his own property which abuts the Gooseberry 
property, would Gooseberry then be able to recover damages from 
Thorsen on the basis that the subdivision could not be built 
because the ditch on the Thorsens property is not aesthetically 
pleasing to adjoining homeowners. The point to be made is that 
once one is outside of the actual acreage encompassed by the 
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ditch, the damages become too remote and uncertain as to be 
proximately caused by defendant's actions. 
CONCLUSION 
The outer limits in terms of the value and quantity of the 
property damaged were set by this Court and supported by the 
clear evidence of the record that as an outer limit, nine lots 
potentially received some degree of damage and that the value of 
the property prior to the injury was $1,250 per acre. The Court 
further found that there was no evidence that the lots were 
totally destroyed and instructed the District Court to find the 
damage by determining the market value of the property before and 
after the injury and apply it to that portion of the nine lots 
which the Court found to be damaged. As one applies the formula 
set by the Supreme Court, the conclusion which is most in accord 
with the facts and evidence and in light of this Court's prior 
opinion, Gooseberry is entitled to recover at most damages for 
the 15 foot strip, 3,150 feet long which occupies 1.08 acres less 
the easement, at a market value of $1,250 per acre and judgment 
should be entered accordingly. /7 
DATED this 2nd day of Marchf 19&&/. 
FREDERICK A. JACKMAN~ " 
Attorney for Harry Thorsen 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
HARRY THORSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
MARKAY JOHNSON, et al., 
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, et al. , 
Plaintiffs, : Civil No. 8461 
-vs-
HARRY THORSEN and DONALD 
GATES, 
Defendants. ) 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
This matter came on before the Court on the Motion of 
Plaintiffs Gooseberry Estates ("Plaintiffs") to reassess damages 
against Defendant Harry Thorsen ("Defendant") based upon the 
Decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Case No. 
18960; 
The Plaintiffs having moved for a new Judgment 
reassessing damages and having supported the same with affidavits 
concerning value of the land immediately before and immediately 
after the dredging of the trench on Plaintiffs1 land; said 
affidavits having declared under oath that the maximum value of 
the land damaged immediately after the injury inflicted upon the 
Plaintiffs' land by Defendant was $100 • 00 per acre and the 
affidavits not having been countered, contradicted or otherwise 
contested by the Defendant; and the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah in the captioned case at 745 P.2d p. 1246 having determined 
that the expert testimony for both the Plaintiffs and Defendant 
fixed the value of the land immediately prior to the damage at 
$1,250.00 per acre; and the Court having viewed the premises, 
considered the evidence in the case at the time of trial and 
based upon such view of the premises, the evidence of trial, and 
the affidavits submitted by the parties, and being fully advised 
in the premises now makes the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. An area which the Court viewed and which had been 
surveyed by licensed surveyors into nine (9) separate tracts 
proposed to be lots in a subdivision, each tract having an 
acreage of 1.53 acres or a total of 13.77 acres, suffered such 
damage that it is totally useless for any purpose except grazing. 
The 13.77 acres having a value of $1,250.00 per acre or 
$17,212.50 prior to the damage inflicted by the Defendant has 
value after the damage of $100.00 per acre or $1,377.00; 
therefore, the Plaintiffs have been damaged in the amount of 
$15,835.50 for the 13.77 acres. 
2. There remained 24 surveyed parcels of 1.53 acres 
per parcel or 36.72 acres which suffered damage to the extent of 
one-half of its prior value at $1,250.00 per acre or $45,900.00, 
for total damage to the 36.72 acres of $22,950.00. 
3. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have suffered 
total damages of $38,785.00. 
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The Court orders that the Judgment of $38,785.00 shall 
bear interest at the statutory rate of twelve (12%) per cent per 
annum from October 12, 1982, the original date of entry of 
Judgment, until satisfied. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes 
the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. The lands of Plaintiffs, as adjudicated by the 
Supreme Court, was subjected to waste committed on Plaintiffs1 
property and Plaintiffs are entitled to damages as decided by the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Case No. 18960, reported at 
745 P.2d at p. 1243. 
B. The Plaintiffs1 land has been damaged by the amount 
of $38,785.00 which constitutes the difference in the values 
approved by the Supreme Court in Case No. 18960 as the agreed 
value of the land immediately prior to the damage and the value 
of the land as determined by this Court immediately after the 
damage. 
C. The Plaintiffs are entitled to interest on the 
amount of reassessed damages from October 12, 1982 at the 
statutory rate of 12% per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiffs be awarded 
their costs in the District Court but not costs of this appeal. 
CfED~~this 22nc 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
SERVED a full, true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Fredrick A. Jackman of 
Jackman and Johnson, Attorneys for Defendant, 1327 South 800 
East, Suite 300, Orem, Utah (84058), by U.S. regular mail, 
postage prepaid, this 22nd day of June, 1988. 
/S/ Ken ChzKborlain 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
HARRY THORSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
MARKAY JOHNSON, et al., 
) 
JUDGMENT 
GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, e t a l . , 
Pla in t i f f s , : Civi l No. 8461 
- v s -
HARRY THORSEN and DONALD 
GATES, 
Defendants. ) 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
This matter came on before the Court on the Motion of 
Plaintiffs Gooseberry Estates ("Plaintiffs") to reassess damages 
against Defendant Harry Thorsen based upon the Decision of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Case No. 18960; 
The Plaintiffs having moved for a new Judgment 
reassessing damages and having supported the same with affidavits 
concerning value of the land immediately before and immediately 
after the dredging of the trench on Plaintiffs1 land; said 
affidavits having declared under oath that the maximum value of 
the land damaged immediately after the injury inflicted upon the 
Plaintiffs' land by Defendant was $100.00 per acre and the 
affidavits not having been countered, contradicted or otherwise 
contested by the Defendant and the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah in the captioned case at 745 P.2d p. 1246 having determined 
that the expert testimony for both the Plaintiffs and Defendant 
fixed the value of the land immediately prior to the damage at 
$1,250.00 per acre and the Court having viewed the premises, 
considered the evidence in the case at the time of trial and 
based upon the evidence at trial, the Court's view of the 
premises, and the affidavits submitted by the parties and the 
Court being advised in the premises and having entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs 
should be and hereby are awarded Judgment in the amount of 
$38,785.00 as damages, to bear interest at the statutory rate of 
twelve (12%) per cent per annum from the original entry of 
Judgment which was October 12, 1982. 
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that Plaintiffs be awarded Judgment 
for their costs in the District Court but not in the Supreme 
Court. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
SERVED a full, true and correct copy of the foregoinc 
Judgment on Fredrick A. Jackman of Jackman and Johnson, Attorneys 
for Defendant, 1327 South 800 East, Suite 300, Orem, Utafc 
(84058), by U.S. regular mail, postage prepaid, this 22nd day of 
June, 1988. 
ADDENDUM "C" 
COURT'S OPINION ON FIRST APPEAL 
grounds and a general verdict is returned, 
we will affirm if the jury properly could 
have found for the prevailing party on any 
of the theories comprehended by the gener-
al verdict. E.g., Barson v. E.R. Squibb & 
Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1984) 
(citing Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. 
Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 301-02 (Utah 1982)). 
[3] The errors that Cambelt raises on 
appeal all relate to Cambelt'a theory that 
Cambelt and Dalton entered into an oral 
contract under which Dalton would act as a 
subcontractor. Dalton's defense and his 
counterclaim were based on the theory that 
he did not contract to construct the storage 
tank support platform, but, instead, agreed 
only to provide Cambelt with a crew. Dal-
ton claimed that he did not take any re-
sponsibility for supervising the job or as-
suring that the platform was built in any 
particular manner. 
At trial, oral testimony by Dalton fully 
supported his theory of the case. Cam-
belt's testimony contradicted it. The jury's 
verdict rejecting Cambelt's claims and 
awarding Dalton some $35,000 in damages 
is entirely consistent with its having ac-
cepted Dalton's testimony and rejected 
Cambelt's as to the nature of the relation-
ship between the parties. The resolution 
of this factual dispute is a matter we leave 
to the jury. We cannot say that the evi-
dence on this issue "so clearly preponder-
ates in favor of the appellant that reason-
able people would not differ on the out-
come of the case." E.A. Strout Western 
Realty Agency, Inc. v. W.C. Foy & Sons, 
Inc., 665 P.2d at 1322 (citing Ute-Cal Land 
Development Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 
1240 (Utah 1980)). The burden on an appel-
lant to establish that the evidence does not 
support the jury's verdict and the factual 
findings implicit in that verdict under such 
a circumstance is quite heavy. We consid-
er the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the verdict, and we will not overturn 
that verdict when it is supported by sub-
stantial and competent evidence. Von 
1. In Scharf v. BMG Corp., we stated this stan-
dard of review as it then applied with respect to 
findings of fact entered in a judge-tried civil 
matter. The promulgation of Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a), which mandates that a trial 
Hake v. Thomas, Wb V.za 766, 769 (Utah 
1985). "To successfully attack the verdict, 
an appellant must marshall all the evidence 
supporting the verdict and then demon-
strate that, even viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to that verdict, the 
evidence is insufficient to support it." Id. 
(citing Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)); > Morgan v. Qua-
ilbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573, 
577 n. 3 (Utah 1985). Therefore, the gener-
al verdict in favor of Dalton is sustainable 
without regard to whether errors may have 
been committed with respect to other is-
sues also submitted to the jury. Barson v. 
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d at 835. 
The verdict is affirmed. Costs to respon-
dent. 
HALL, C.J., STEWART, Associate 
C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur. 
HOWE, Justice (concurring). 
I reluctantly concur, recognizing that the 
majority opinion in Barson v. E.R. Squibb 
& Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984), to 
which opinion I dissented, announced the 
rule that a general verdict will be sustained 
if any one of the theories or defenses ad-
vanced by the prevailing party and on 
which the jury could have relied in finding 
for the prevailing party was not infected 
with error. In the instant case, it is impos-
sible for us as a reviewing court to know 
(1) whether the jury returned a verdict in 
favor of Dalton because they found that he 
did not enter into a contract with Cambelt 
to construct the platform, but instead had 
only agreed to provide Cambelt with the 
crew, or (2) whether the jury found in favor 
of Dalton because even though he had en-
tered into a contract with Cambelt, he had 
no liability for the collapse of the platform 
because it fell due, in whole or part, to 
some fault on the part of Cambelt. The 
trial court admitted evidence of contrib-
utory negligence by Cambelt over its objec-
tion that contributory negligence was not a 
judge's findings of fact "shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous," alters this standard 
somewhat in judge-tried cases. Still, the stan-
dard has continuing validity in regard to a jury's 
factual findings. 
aeiense to its action based upon breach of 
warranty. After having admitted that evi-
dence, the trial court refused to give to the 
jury any instructions on the law in this 
state on contributory negligence and com-
parative negligence, even though the de-
fendant submitted proposed instructions on 
that subject. Both the admission of such 
evidence and the refusal to give such in-
structions are Cambelt's major assign-
ments of error on this appeal. 
We now refuse to consider the propriety 
of the trial court's action, indulging in the 
presumption that the general verdict was 
reached by the jury on the ground that 
there was no construction contract between 
the parties, a defense to which the claimed 
errors do not pertain. As expressed in my 
dissenting opinion in Barson v. Squibb, 
supra, I would not follow such practice in 
our appellate review for the reasons dis-
cussed and based upon the authority cited 
therein. 
For what little consolation it may be to 
Cambelt, if the jury strictly followed the 
instructions given them, any contributory 
negligence or fault of Cambelt should not 
have influenced their verdict. The instruc-
tions made it clear that if they found that 
Cambelt delivered plans and specifications 
to Dalton which were part of the agree-
ment between them, and Dalton failed to 
follow them and thereby constructed a 
faulty and defective platform, they should 
return a verdict in favor of Cambelt. Con-
tributory negligence or fault on the part of 
Cambelt was not mentioned as a factor 
they should consider. 
(o fKfVNUMIUSVS!fM> 
Harry THORSEN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Markay JOHNSON, and Bryce Johns* 
individually, and Markay Johnson a 
Bryce Johnson, dba Gooseberry 1 
tates, a partnership, Defendants a 
Respondents. 
GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, a partnernh 
consisting of Tokaco Enterprises (itn« 
a family partnership consisting of W 
liam T. Gardner and his children W 
liam Todd Gardner, Karl Ann Gardnc 
and Corrina Ann Gardner), Latig 
Inc., a corporation; Tell W. Gardru 
Bryce Johnson; Markay Johnson at 
Leonard V. Elfervig, all dba Goosebe 
ry Estates, a Utah Partnership, Plait 
tiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Harry THORSEN and Donald Gates, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 18960. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 5, 1987. 
Landowner brought action agains 
downstream user for damages to propose* 
real estate development caused when down 
stream user dredged inactive irrigatior 
ditch which coursed through development 
The Sixth District Court, Sevier County 
Don V. Tibbs, J., entered judgment in favoi 
of owner. The downstream user appealed 
The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that 
(1) evidence supported finding that down 
stream user exceeded and abused right to 
enter upon owner's land to clean ditch and 
that he was liable for damages, and (2) 
damages found were based upon erroneous 
measure. 
Affirmed in part, and reversed and re-
manded in part. 
Zimmerman, J., filed an opinion concur-
ring in the result. 
Durham, J., filed a concurring and dis-
senting opinion. 
Evidence supported finding that down-
stream user of irrigation water exceeded 
and abused his right to enter upon anoth-
er's land to clean irrigation ditch and that 
he was thus liable for damages; dredging 
amounted to substantial widening and 
deepening of ditch whereby large number 
of trees were uprooted and excessive 
amount of earth and rocks excavated. 
2. Damages «=>138 
Generally measure of damages for in-
jury to real property is difference between 
value of property immediately before and 
immediately after injury. 
3. Waters and Water Courses <3=>247U) 
Damages to proposed real estate devel-
opment when downstream user dredged in-
active irrigation ditch which coursed 
through development were arrived at based 
upon erroneous measure; there was no evi-
dence supporting trial court's finding that 
lots had a fair market value of $6,000 be-
fore ditch was enlarged or that ditch totally 
destroyed land, and expert's appraisal was 
based on assumption that no one had law-
ful irrigation ditch easement through lots, 
which was an erroneous assumption. 
Norman H. Jackson, Richfield, for appel-
lants. 
Ken Chamberlain, Richfield, for respon-
dents. 
HOWE, Justice: 
This is an appeal from a judgment in 
favor of Gooseberry Estates, a partnership, 
against Harry Thorsen and Donald Gates 
(hereinafter Thorsen) for damages to a pro-
posed real estate development in Sevier 
County caused when Thorsen dredged an 
inactive irrigation ditch which coursed 
through the development. 
[1] Thorsen was a downstream user of 
the irrigation water and contended that he 
had the right to enter upon Gooseberry's 
property for the lawful purpose of cleaning 
1. Another measure of damages, discussed in the 
dissent, is the cost of restoring the damaged 
trees. In Pehrson v. Saderup, 28 Utah 2d 77, 
ditch had long been abandoned, that anoth-
er ditch had been established in another 
location to carry Thorsen's water, and that 
he did the dredging for the sole purpose of 
preventing the use of Gooseberry's land for 
a planned subdivision to which he, as a 
nearby landowner, was opposed. The case 
was tried before the court without a jury, 
and the trial judge made a personal inspec-
tion of the property. In entering judgment 
in favor of Gooseberry, the trial court 
made findings of fact which are not clear 
as to whether the court found that the 
ditch had been abandoned prior to the 
dredging. However, at the oral argument 
of this case before this Court, counsel for 
Gooseberry admitted that the trial court 
did not find an abandonment and that Thor-
sen had an easement through Gooseberry's 
land for the ditch. 
Nevertheless, in other findings of fact, 
the court found that the dredging by Thor-
sen greatly exceeded the mere cleaning of 
the ditch and amounted to a substantial 
widening and deepening of the ditch where-
by a large number of trees were uprooted 
and an excessive amount of earth and 
rocks were excavated. Specifically, the 
court found that the ditch "should not have 
been cleaned or dug up in the manner that 
it was and if there had been any right at all 
it would have been merely the right of 
running a plow through the area, the right 
merely to handclean the ditch and it would 
have delivered more water under the cir-
cumstances than it will at the present 
time." The evidence fully supports the 
findings of fact and conclusions of the 
court that Thorsen exceeded and abused 
his right to enter upon Gooseberry's land 
to clean the ditch and that he is liable for 
damages. 
[2,3] Thorsen further contends that the 
damages found against him were excessive 
and based upon an erroneous measure. Al-
though there are exceptions and varia-
tions,1 generally the measure of damages 
498 P.2d 648 (1972), we refused to employ that 
measure of damages where lilacs growing 
around a rental unit were destroyed. We held 
between the value ot the property immedi-
ately before and immediately after the inju-
ry (often referred to as the "Diminution in 
Value" rule). Pehrson v. Saderup, 28 
Utah 2d 77, 498 P.2d 648 (1972); Brereton 
v. Dixon, 20 Utah 2d 64, 433 P.2d 3 (1967); 
22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 132. The trial 
court apparently endeavored to apply this 
measure of damages when it announced: 
The court finds that there were nine lots 
which were totally destroyed, and the 
court sets the value of $6,000 per lot and 
in its present condition and not being 
improved based upon the work up to that 
time; the plaintiffs are awarded a judg-
ment of $54,000. That's based upon 
$6,000 per lot for the nine lots. 
This analysis is flawed in two respects. 
There was no evidence that the "lots" had 
a fair market value of $6,000 before Thor-
sen enlarged the ditch, and there was no 
evidence that the ditch totally destroyed 
nine "lots." The following factual back-
ground is helpful to an understanding of 
why the trial court erred. 
On May 14, 1979, Gooseberry entered 
into a contract with Bryce Johnson to pur-
chase from him 94.47 acres of land for a 
total of $66,750 or $706.57 per acre. John-
son had acquired the 94.47 acres on July 
30, 1978, for the same price. Gooseberry 
contemplated subdividing 50.59 acres of 
that tract into a development of thirty-
three lots, containing 1.53 acres per lot. 
During the seventeen months which 
elapsed from May 14, 1979, when Goose-
berry purchased the land, to October of 
1980, when Thorsen damaged the land, no 
improvements were placed upon the proper-
ty by Gooseberry. A preliminary subdivi-
sion plat was prepared, but a final plat had 
not been approved or recorded. Gooseber-
ry expended $8,400 for surveying, map-
ping, and platting. It also expended $7,100 
in an attempt to drill a well to provide 
culinary water for the lots. Adequate wa-
ter was not found. At the time of trial, 
that it would be unreasonable to there employ 
that measure, but recognized that it might be 
reasonable in a case where an ornamental tree 
was damaged on a residential lot. In the in-
stant case, costs of restoration would be unrea-
chase oi the property. uooseDerry put on 
testimony that the projected cost of the 
improvements was $171,125, but this did 
not include a central sewage system which 
the county later required. 
The $6,000-per-lot damage found by the 
lower court was apparently based on testi-
mony given by an appraiser, Kenneth Esp-
lin, that if and when the subdivision was 
approved and recorded, water was made 
available, and the improvements were in 
place, the lots should sell for $12,000 each. 
He opined that ten of the proposed lots 
were damaged so as to reduce their poten-
tial value by 50 percent, or to $6,000 each. 
Esplin admitted that he was not very famil-
iar with the market for mountain lots in 
Sevier County where the property was lo-
cated. He based his opinion on sales made 
in the Cedar City and Fairview areas in 
other counties. Counsel for Thorsen re-
peatedly objected to Esplin's testimony on 
the grounds that it was speculative, conjec-
tural, and irrelevant. 
The difficulty with Esplin's testimony, 
and the court's judgment which was based 
upon it, is that at the time Thorsen inflicted 
damage upon the realty, the property was 
in a pristine state exactly the same as when 
it had been purchased seventeen months 
earlier. It is true that Gooseberry had 
expended $15,500 in preparations to im-
prove it with the expectation that some day 
it would become a subdivision of mountain 
lots. However, before this expectation 
could be realized, Gooseberry would have 
to finish paying for the land, develop a 
culinary water supply approved by the 
health department, and install a central 
sewage system. Then, county planning 
and zoning approval of the final plat, to-
gether with approval by the County Com-
mission, would have to be granted. There-
after, financing for hundreds of thousands 
of dollars worth of improvements would 
have to be obtained. When the improve-
sonable since the value of an acre of similar 
land would be $1,250 and restoration costs 
would exceed $100,000 on the 1.08 acres which 
Thorsen damages. 
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ready and willing to pay $12,000 for each 
of the thirty-three lots would have to be 
found. 
In viewing Gooseberry's land as a com-
pleted subdivision, Esplin and the trial 
court lost sight of the fact that the mea-
sure of damages is the diminution of the 
fair market value of the property immedi-
ately following the infliction of the dam-
age—not what the property may be worth 
when and if substantial sums of money are 
expended to turn it into an improved subdi-
vision. In State v. Tedesco, 4 Utah 2d 248, 
291 P.2d 1028 (1956), a condemnation case 
in which the jury was instructed to find the 
fair market value of the property, we quot-
ed with approval from Pennsylvania S. V. 
R. Co. v. Cleary, 125 Pa. 442, 17 A. 468 
(1889). 
It is proper to inquire what the tract is 
worth, having in view the purposes for 
which it is best adapted, but it is the 
tract, and not the lots into which it might 
be divided, that is to be valued The 
jury are to value the tract of land and 
that only. They are not to determine 
how it could best be divided into building 
lots, nor conjecture how fast they could 
be sold, nor at what price per lot. A 
speculator or investor, in deciding what 
price he could afford to pay, would con-
sider the chances and probabilities of the 
situation as then actually existing. A 
jury should do the same thing. They are 
not to inquire what a speculator might be 
able to realize out of a resale in the 
future, but what a present purchaser 
would be willing to pay for it in the 
condition it is now in. 
More recently, the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado in Department of Highways v. Schul-
hoff, 167 Colo. 72, 445 P.2d 402, 405 (1968), 
quoted the above passage from Pennsylva-
nia S. V.R. Co. v. Cleary and restated the 
same rule as follows: 
It is proper to show that a particular 
tract of land is suitable and available for 
subdivision into lots and is valuable for 
that purpose. It is not proper, however, 
to show the number and value of lots as 
separated parcels in an imaginary subdi-
vision thereof. Stated differently, it is 
improper iur uie jury u> consider an un-
developed tract of land as though a sub-
division thereon is an accomplished fact. 
Such undeveloped property may not be 
valued on a per lot basis, the cost factor 
clearly being too speculative. 
By fixing the damages based on a complet-
ed, improved subdivision, the trial court 
valued the land before it was damaged at 
$3,921 per acre, whereas it had been pur-
chased seventeen months earlier at $706.57 
per acre. This amounts to a 450 percent 
increase in value—without a single im-
provement to the realty. Significantly, ap-
praiser Esplin testified that the remaining 
43.88 acres of the 94.47 acres purchased by 
Gooseberry (which were not going to be 
subdivided) had a fair market value of 
$1,250 per acre. This was exactly the same 
value per acre ascribed to the entire 94.47-
acre tract by Thorsen's appraiser, Joseph 
S. Stott Stott belonged to a firm which 
had been marketing real estate in Sevier 
County for seven years. Mountain subdivi-
sion lots had been advertised for sale and 
listed with his agency. However, he testi-
fied, "in the years that I have been in the 
business, we have yet to sell a mountain lot 
out of our office." 
Esplin's appraisal was also flawed be-
cause it was based on his assumption that 
no one had a lawful irrigation ditch ease-
ment through the "lots." This was errone-
ous. As previously mentioned, at oral ar-
gument of this case before this Court, 
counsel for Gooseberry Estates admitted 
that the trial court did not find an abandon-
ment and that Thorsen had an easement 
for the irrigation ditch. 
Additionally, while Esplin testified that 
the ditch as enlarged by Thorsen would 
reduce the potential value of any improved 
lot from $12,000 to $6,000, he did not testi-
fy that the value of any of the proposed 
lots was totally destroyed by the enlarged 
ditch. To the contrary, he testified the 
ditch diminished their potential value by 50 
percent. Thus, there is no basis in the 
evidence for the trial court's conclusion 
that the value of the nine lots was totally 
destroyed. The ditch, as widened and deep-
ened by Thorsen, was fifteen feet wide. 
The remainder of the proposed 1.53-acre 
lots through which the ditch coursed was 
undamaged2 and could be used at a mini-
mum for grazing purposes. The entire 
ditch occupied 1.08 acres (3,150 ft. long x 
15 ft. wide). This would be the maximum 
land which could have been "totally de-
stroyed." It too assumes, contrary to the 
admission of Gooseberry's counsel, that 
Thorsen had no right at all to an easement. 
Since the amount of damages found by 
the trial court was arrived at by an errone-
ous method, we reverse the judgment and 
remand the case to the trial court for reas-
sessment of damages. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, 
Associate C.J., concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring in 
the result): 
I agree with Justice Durham's statement 
of the law of damages. However, I agree 
with the majority that the trial court made 
several unjustified assumptions in fixing 
the amount of damages. Therefore, I join 
the majority in remanding the case for a 
reassessment of damages. In making that 
reassessment, I would hold that the trial 
court should be guided by the broader dam-
age principles discussed in Justice Dur-
ham's opinion. 
DURHAM, Justice (concurring and 
dissenting): 
I join the majority opinion in affirming 
the judgment as to liability, but dissent 
from its treatment of the damage question. 
The measure of damages for permanent 
injury to land and damage to trees was 
recently treated by the Utah Court of Ap-
peals in Ault v. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117 
(Utah Ct.App.1987): 
Generally, the measure of damages for 
permanent injury to land is the differ-
ence in the market value of the land 
immediately before and immediately af-
ter the injury, but if the land may be 
restored to its original condition, the cost 
of restoration may be used as the mea-
2. We recognize that the ditch, as enlarged, 
might possibly impair access to parts of the 
sure of damages if it does not exceed the 
diminution in the market value. 
Id. at 1120 (citations omitted). The opinion 
correctly notes that the above standard is 
not a rigid one and that "even when dimi-
nution in value is clearly the appropriate 
measure of damages, evidence as to repair 
costs is admissible for the purpose of help-
ing (the fact finder] determine the loss of 
value." Id. at 1121 (citations omitted). 
In Brereton v. Dixon, 20 Utah 2d 64, 433 
P.2d 3 (1967), this Court endorsed a flexible 
rule particularly applicable for damages to 
land associated with destruction of trees on 
the realty. 
When property has been damaged or 
destroyed by a wrongful act, the desired 
objective is to ascertain as accurately as 
possible the amount of money that will 
fairly and adequately compensate the 
owner for his loss. 
Because of the fact that any attempt 
at unvarying uniformity in applying ei-
ther [the diminution in value rule or the 
separate value rule], a third rule, which 
we believe to be the better considered 
and more practical one, has been applied. 
It gives the injured party the benefit of 
whichever of the two rules will best 
serve the objective hereinabove stated of 
giving him reasonable and adequate com-
pensation for his actual loss as related to 
his use of his property If he wants 
to maintain a fruit orchard, a wood lot, 
or even a primitive area, though his prop-
erty may be more valuable if turned to 
an industrial or residential purpose, that 
should be his prerogative; and if it is 
wrongfully destroyed or damaged, the 
wrongdoer should pay for the actual 
damage he caused. 
Id. at 66, 67-68, 433 P.2d at 5-6. 
A few years later, in Pehrson v. Sader-
up, 28 Utah 2d 77, 498 P.2d 648 (1972), this 
Court quoted with approval the following 
language from Thatcher v. Lane Con-
struction Co., 21 Ohio App.2d 41, 254 N.E. 
2d 703 (1970): 
proposed lots, but there was no evidence ad-
duced on this subject. 
tial to the planned use of property for a 
homesite in accordance with the taste 
and wishes of its owner, where not un-
reasonable and where such trees are de-
stroyed by trespassers, the owner may 
be awarded as damages the fair cost of 
restoring his land to a reasonable ap-
proximation of its former condition, if 
such restoration be practical, without 
necessary limitation to diminution in mar-
ket value of such land. 
28 Utah 2d at 79, 498 P.2d at 650 (citing 
Thatcher, 21 Ohio App.2d at 49, 254 N.E.2d 
at 708). The Pehrson opinion goes on to 
state what I believe to be a sound and just 
rule: "In a determination of the appropri-
ate measure of damages in this area, the 
cardinal principles are flexibility of ap-
proach and full compensation to the owner, 
within the overall limitation of reasonable-
ness." Pehrson, 28 Utah 2d at 79, 498 
P.2d at 650. 
The trial court in this case found as fact 
that defendant Thorsen "willfully and in-
tentionally . . . [made] a massive, senseless, 
purposeless ditch across [plaintiffs'] prem-
ises." A review of the numerous photo-
graphs in the record explains the finding 
that the trial judge, after personal inspec-
tion of the land, was "shocked at the dam-
age which was done to the premises . . . 
and [had] grave doubts whether or not the 
property . . . can ever be used for the pur-
poses for which they [sic] were bought by 
the Plaintiffs." The evidence showed that 
more than two hundred mature pine trees 
and one hundred and seventy cedars over 
eight feet tall were uprooted by defendant. 
Plaintiffs' experts testified that replacing 
them would cost approximately $275 per 
tree and that the trees on the lots were 
extremely important to the development 
and sale of the lots. Other testimony es-
tablished that many lots would not even be 
saleable without grading and reseeding at 
a cost of $80,000 without replacing any 
trees. In short, although disputed, there 
was considerable evidence upon which the 
trial court could rely in awarding $54,000. 
In view of the malice that motivated this 
destruction, I am not in the least troubled 
by the flexible approach the trial judge 
rule. In fact, I think he would have been 
justified in using the restoration costs, 
within some reasonable limit, as a measure 
of damages. Fifty-four thousand dollars, 
as compared to the cost of replacing the 
destroyed trees (more than $100,000) seems 
very reasonable to me. The majority's ap-
proach is, I believe, contrary to our case 
law supporting the principle of full compen-
sation within the overall limitation of rea-
sonableness. 
Finally, I note that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-38-3 (1987), upon which plaintiffs ap-
parently did not rely, provides for the tre-
bling of civil damages against "any person 
who cuts down . . . or otherwise injures 
any tree . . . on the land of another person 
. . . without lawful authority." 
Karla KISHPAUGH (Kornmayer), 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Richard Bruce KISHPAUGH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20423. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 6, 1987. 
Natural father filed petition to modify 
divorce decree to change custody. Mater-
nal grandparents filed petition to obtain 
guardianship over child. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Dean E. Conder, 
J., awarded custody to grandparents. Fa-
ther appealed. The Supreme Court, Zim-
merman, J., held that: (1) presumption fa-
voring custody by natural parent was 
rebutted and trial court was permitted to 
base custody award solely on its determina-
tion of the child's best interests once it 
found that all three requirements for rebut-
tal of presumption had generally been met, 
viz., that no strong mutual bond exists be-
demonstrated willingness to sacrifice self-
interest for child, and that parent lacks sym-
pathy for child; (2) the trial court was not 
clearly erroneous in determining that the 
natural-parent-presumption had been rebut-
ted; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in determining that child's best 
interests required placement with grandpar-
ents. 
Affirmed. 
Stewart, Associate C.J., concurred in 
the result. 
Howe, J., dissented and filed opinion in 
which Hall, C.J., concurred. 
1. Infants «=>19.3(5) 
Existing-placement presumption, which 
favors existing custody arrangement, must 
be overcome by showing of changed cir-
cumstances before court may apply the 
best-interest test to petition for change of 
custody. (Per Zimmerman, J., with one 
Justice concurring and one Justice concur-
ring in the result.) 
2. Parent and Child <?»2(8) 
In the absence of strong showing re-
butting natural-parent presumption, which 
favors custody by natural parent over cus-
tody by nonparent, custody disputes will be 
disposed of in accordance with natural-par-
ent presumption. (Per Zimmerman, J., 
with one Justice concurring and one Justice 
concurring in the result.) 
3. Parent and Child «=>2(3.1, 8) 
The trial court may base custody 
award, in dispute between parent and non-
parent, on its own determination of best 
interests of child only if it finds that no 
strong mutual bond exists between parent 
and child, that parent has not demonstrated 
willingness to sacrifice own interest and 
welfare for child's, and that parent lacks 
sympathy for and understanding of child 
that is characteristic of parents generally; 
however, this rule does not have to be 
mechanically applied, and natural-parent 
presumption is rebutted when the trial 
court finds general lack of the above char-
acteristics. (Per Zimmerman, J., with one 
duauce concurring ana one Justice concur 
ring in the result.) 
4. Parent and Child «=»2(8) 
Inference favoring custody award to 
natural parent was rebutted when trial 
court's findings, taken as a whole, generally 
established that no strong mutual bond ex-
isted between natural parent and child, par-
ent had not demonstrated willingness to 
sacrifice own interests for child, and parent 
lacked sympathy and understanding of 
child. (Per Zimmerman, J., with one Justice 
concurring and one Justice concurring in 
the result.) 
5. Parent and Child «=»2(8) 
The trial court was not clearly errone-
ous in finding that presumption favoring 
custody by natural parent had been rebut-
ted, in custody dispute between natural 
father and maternal grandparents. (Per 
Zimmerman, J., with one Justice concurring 
and one Justice concurring in the result.) 
6. Parent and Child «=»2(3.4, 3.7, 15) 
The trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion and did not fail to follow appropriate 
standards in determining that best inter-
ests of child, who had cerebral palsy and 
severe hearing impairment that rendered 
him functionally deaf, required granting of 
custody to maternal grandparents, rather 
than to natural father; grandparents had 
developed warm and stable relationship 
with child as result of having taken care of 
child for more than three years between 
time of divorce and time when natural fa-
ther decided to seek custody, and child 
preferred to live with grandparents. (Per 
Zimmerman, J., with one Justice concurring 
and one Justice concurring in the result.) 
Michael Z. Hayes and Ronald L. Dunn, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appel-
lant. 
Jane Allen, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
and respondent. 
ADDENDUM "D" 
APPRAISAL OF KEN ESPLIN 
APPRAISAL REPORT 
ON 
GOOSEBERRY ESTATES 
FOR 
KEN CHAMBERLAIN 
REPORT BY ESPLIN-ROBISON REAL ESTATE SERVICES 
Esplin-Robison Real Estate Services, Inc. 
112 South Main, Cedar City, Utah 84720 (801)586-4435 
Mr. Ken Chamberlain 
Attorney-at-Law 
76 South Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Dear Mr. Chamberlain, 
I have personally inspected and appraised the property identified as 
Goodebery Estates near Salina, Sevier County, Utah, consisting of 
94.49 acres as identified in this report. The purpose being to report to 
you my opinion of the demunition of value of nine lots in Goosebery Estates 
casued by the canal put through these lots. 
Based on the examination and study made, I have formed an opinion that 
on the date mentioned the property had a value of: 
Land Value before Canal $448,656.00 
Value after Canal 388,656.00 
Difference $ 60,000.00 
The following report presents a review of the appraisal and analysis of 
the date along with other material on which the value was predicated. 
Thank you for the privilege 
KWE:glg 
N REAL ESTATE SERVICES 
UJ 
ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITING CONDITIONS 
This appraisal has been based upon the following assumptions and limit-
ing conditions: 
That I assume no responsibility for matters legal in nature, nor do I 
render any opinion as to the title which is assumed to be good. All 
existing liens and encumbrances securing payment of money have been 
disregarded and the property is appraised as though free and clear and 
under responsible ownership and competent management. 
This appraisal has been made from maps, legal descriptions, and data 
furnished by the property owner which are assumed to be correct. 
I believe the information contained in this report, which was furnished 
by others, to be true and correct; however, no responsibility is assumed 
for errors or omissions, or for information not disclosed which might 
otherwise affect the feasibility and valuation estimate. 
No soil reports concerning the subject property were available to the 
appraiser. This valuation assumes that the soil conditions are adequate 
to support standard construction consistent with the highest and best 
use. 
Possession of this repqrt, or a copy thereof, does not carry with it the 
right of publication, nor may it be reproduced in whole or part, in any 
manner, by any person, without the written consent of the appraiser. 
Neither all nor any part of the contents of this report shall be con-
veyed to the public through advertising, public relations, news, sales, 
or other media, without the written consent and approval of the author, 
particularly as to the valuation conclusions, the identity of the ap-
praiser, and of the firm with which I am connected. 
I am prepared, but not required, to give testimony or attendance in 
court by reason of this appraisal with reference to the property in 
question unless additional arrangements are made therefore. 
\*) 
APPRAISAL REPORT 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROPERTY 
Subject property is a 94.47 acre parcel of vacant land at the present time. 
There has at one time been a portion of this land farmed. The property appraised 
herein is platted and preliminarily approved as a subdivision. 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
All of Lot 4, Section 19, T22S, R2E, SLB&M, and all of Lot 1, Section 30, 
T22S, R2E, SLB&M; also the Northerly 490.74 feet of Lot 2, Section 30, T22S, 
R2E, SLB&M. 
Containing 94.47 acres. 
OSTENSIBLE OWNERSHIP 
According to the official Sevier County records, as of April 1, 1982, title 
to the property is held in the name of Victory Roy, under contract of sale to 
Bryce Johnson. 
PURPOSE AND EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE APPRAISAL 
The purpose of this apprisal is to estimate the market value of the fee simple 
title to the subject property, as of April 1, 1982. It is appraised as if free 
of all liens, encumbrances and indebtedness...to determine the demunition of 
value caused by a canal across the property. 
DEFINITION OF MARKET VALUE 
Market value is undetsood to be " . . .the highest price in terms of money which 
the property will bring in a competitive and open market under all conditions 
requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller each acting prudently and 
knowledgeably, and assuming the price is not affected by undue stimulus." A 
more complete definition of market value is incluedd in the addendum to this 
report. By this specific reference it is made a part of this report. 
DEFINITION OF HIGHEST AND BEST USE 
Highest and best use is understood to mean the most profitable, likely, 
legal use of a property. A more complete definition of highest and best use is 
i n r l u d p r l i n thp arlrlpnrinm t o thnc r o n n r t Rw +hnc c n a r i f i r ^ f o v o n r o •?+ «? <* ma^a 
CITY AND REGIONAL DATA 
This property is located in a region known as the Intermountain West. 
It includes all of Utah, as well as portions of Nevada, Wyoming, Colorado, 
Idaho, and Arizona. The state of Utah has an estimated population of about 
1,400,000. Approximately 80% of these reside in th largely urban area known 
as the "Wasatch Front". This strip is located along a north-south line in 
the valleys which nestle at the base of the westerly slopes of the Wasatch 
Mountain Range between Santaquin on the south and Brigham City on the north. 
Except for a few strategically located towns and small cities, the balance of 
the state is relatively sparsely populated. 
AREA DESCRIPTION 
Subject property is located 6 miles south and slightly east of Salina, Utah. 
Salina is the major stop on Interstate 70, which starts at Green River, Utah, 
and has progressed as far as Salina. It is projected to go further west and 
joint 1-15 at Cover Fort. It will be the fastest and best route through Southern 
Utah. Salina is also one of the last large towns going south on Highway 89 to the 
parks and into Arizona. 
Because of these features, and the fact that several large corporations have 
manufacturing plants in the area as well as several coal mines, Salina has 
maintained a remarkably stable economy. This activity is coupled with the 
agricultural and dairy herds to complete the present-day economy of the area. 
Mining activity has slowed slightly but is expected to bounce back. 
The future economics of the area should trend upwards as tourism along 1-70 begins 
to make its influence felt in the area and motels and allied services should 
begin to proliferate. 
Salina has both rail and truck service. However, the nearest airport is a small 
private strip, unattended and with tie-down facilities only. It is six miles 
north. The nearest airport which is attended and has services is at Richfield, 
Utah, about 20 miles to the southwest of Salina. Richfield is the county seat 
of Sevier County. Salina has a population of 2,128 and Richfield about 6,225. 
The county has a population of 15,552. All figures are approximate as they 
came from the 1980 county figures and the 5-Counties organization research. 
The altitude in the area is between 4,800 and 6,000. The rainfall ranges from 
8 to 12 inches yearly and most crops are irrigated. The altitude of the 
subject property is approximately 6,250 feet. 
PURPOSE AND FUNCTION OF THE APPRAISAL 
The purpose of this appraisal is to estimate the fair market unencumbered 
fee value of the subject property. 
The function of the appraisal is to be used as a value guide in financial 
matters relating to the property. 
DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM AND SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION 
The problem involves the investigation of the real estate market in the area 
to arrive at a current market value of the property similar in character, 
to be used as a basis of comparison in arriving at a value indicative 
of the subject land. 
Businessmen, buyers, and sellers were contacted. County records of land sales 
were investigated and interviews with knowledgeable persons regarding real 
estate prices were made. 
In addition the land owners and local realtors were interviewed as to values. 
The problem in this appraisal is determining the demunition in value cause by a can 
across the property. 
SUMMARY OF APPRAISAL FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Property Appraised: The property subject of this appraisal consists of 
94.47 acres of which 50.59 have been platted into a 
residential subdivsiion. The balance to remain open 
meadow and farm. 
Estate Appraised: Full fee simple 
Owned by: Presently vested in Victor Roy, being sold under 
contract to Bryce Johnson, contract dated June 1978. 
Date appraisal Estimates 
Are Applied: April 1, 1982 
Value Calculation: 
Before (43.88 ac + 33 
lots) 
Demunition Damage 
(10 lots damaged 50%) 
Total Damages 
Rounded to 
Reaming Value after 
Di fference 
Value calculated on a finished subdivision basis 
$448,656.00 
(60,000.00) 
$ 60,000.o0 
$ 60,000.00 
$388,656.00 
$ 60,000.00 
If these lots are not saleable because of the denuding of the strip, it may 
cause the project to become unfeasible because of development costs compared 
to return. 
NEIGHBORHOOD DATA 
Subject property is located appxoimately 6 miles south and slightly east of 
Salina, Utah. This parcel of property is surrounded by agricultural properties, 
both irrigated farm land and dry brush pasture and dry farm land. There is also 
other subdivision development in the area. 
SITE DATA 
The property is a 94.47 acre parcel of land that is rectangular in shape and is 
gently sloping from east to west and south to north. There is enough water with 
this property to provide ample culinary water for the 33 proposed year round lots. 
50.59 acres of the subject property have been platted into 33 lots. The remaining 
43.88 acres are to remain open meadow and farm land. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE IMPROVEMENTS 
Improvements are not a factor in this appraisal as none are disturbed by the 
advent of the canal and destruction of trees in instally same. 
ZONING DATA 
Subject property is presently zoned county agricultural. 
ASSESSMENT AND TAX DATA 
As of the effective date of this appraisal, for tax purposes, the realty included 
in the appraisal is taxed as follows: 
Serial No. 4-1-48-2 and 4-1-48-6 
Market Valuation: 
Land $4,500 
Buildings none 
Personal Property none 
1981 Taxes $169.05 
HIGHEST AND BEST USE 
In estimating the highest and best use of this property, particular attention 
was given to the four forces that create value; i.e., physical-environmental, 
social, political-governmental, and economic. The site is well adapted physically 
and environmentally for residential subdivision purposes because of its setting 
and its proximity to Salina, Utah. Due to its orientation to the community and 
other facilities and due to its physical characteristics, it is best suited, 
physically, for a ranchette residential subdivision. 
UTILITIES 
The only utility available to the property at the present time is power from 
Utah Power and Light, culinary water to come from a well on the property. A 
sanitary sewer facility could be installed using septic tank and leach line 
system. Telephone service is available from Utah Power and Light. 
STREETS AND ACCESS 
Subject property is accessable from a paved road that is maintained by 
the state of Utah and Sevier County. 
VALUE ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
The appraisal process is based on three approaches to value. These 
reflect the three investment alternatives available to participants in 
the market. These are named the direct sales comparison approach, the 
reproduction cost approach, and the income capitalization approach. In 
the addendum to this report, a full explanation of each of the three 
approaches of the final estimate of value are included. By specific re-
ference, it is made a part of this report. 
REPRODUCTION COST APPROACH 
Not a factor as there are no improvements, building wise on the property. 
DIRECT SALES COMPARISON APPROACH 
In estimating the market value of the property by market comparison, 
sales of other competing properties were sought in the market. Those 
selected as most competative were selected as comparable sales. In ad-
justing these, several elements of comparability were considered, such 
as the date of sales, the size and shape, physical characteristics, 
highest and best use, sale conditions and location. The units of com-
parison are per lot and per acre. The market was searched for comparable sales. 
The list that follows includes those that were concluded to be the most 
applicable. 
ADDENDUM 
#1: 
Grantor: Willard M. Tucker 
Grantee: Ray L. Webb 
Date: Spring 1979 
Size: 55.47 acres platted and engineered into a 42 l o t 
subdivision. (2 lots reserved to sel ler) 
Price: $240,000.00 or $6,000.00 per Lot. 
Remarks: This sale was prior to any improvements other than 
rough graded roads. This subdivision is known as 
Fairview Heights. 
e#2; 
Grantor: Ray L. Webb 
Grantee: Hal B. Jensen 
Date: July 20, 1981 
Size: 0.930 acor, Lot 5, Fairview Heights Subdivision 
Price: $14,000.00 cash 
Remarks: This is the sale of a lo t in the subdivision that was 
sold in sale #1. 
e #3: 
Grantor: Ron Bangater 
Grantee: James L. Larsen 
Date: May 1980 
Size: 0.920 acre (lot in Fairview Heights) 
Price: $11,000.00 cash 
Remarks: This sale was made before any of the improvements were 
in and was a cash sale. 
e #4: 
Grantor: 
Grantee: 
Date: 
Size: 
Price: 
Terms: 
Remarks: 
Acord Lales Mountain retreet 
undisclosed 
June 1982 
6.6 Acres 
$8,000.00 
Contract sale 10% down balance over 7 years @ 12% int. 
this lot had trees on approximately 3 acres of the site. 
This sale is the sale of Lot 3-A in Acord Lakes Mountain 
retreet. 
e #5: 
Grantor: 
Grantee: 
Date: 
Size: 
Price: 
Remarks: 
Acord Lakes Mountain Retreet Corp. 
Roger Arensen 
July 1982 
5.51 acres Lot 213 Acord Lakes Subdivision 
$4,000.00, cash, 
The buyer in this case agreed to buy three other lots, 
In addition this lot has very few trees on it.' 
Sale #6: 
Grantor: Acord Lakes Mountain Retreet Corp 
Grantee: flpdisclQsid 
Date: April 1982 
Size: 6.62 Acres (lot 172 Acord Lakes) 
Price: $3,000.00 
Remarks: There are no trees on thsi lot and it was a cash sale. 
Sale #7: 
There have been in the past year re-sales of three of the better 
tree covered lots in the Acord Lakes Mountain Retreet. Two of these 
lots sold for $11,000.00 Each, and one for $15,000.00. 
Correlation of Sales: 
Sale #1 indicates the value of an engineered and platted subdivision 
in the market as apposed to raw land. This sale property is very similar 
to the subject property in that the size is very close ot the platted 
subdivision subject of this appraisal, it is in the county above Fairview 
and the lots in this subdivision are similar in size to those in the 
proposed Gooseberry Estates subdivision. 
Sales 2 and 3 indicate the value of such lots with the improvements in 
place. Sales 4 through six indicate the large difference there is between 
lots with good tree cover and those that have few or no trees. 
These sales indicate a reasonable value of $12,000.00 per lot for the 
Gooseberry Estates lots in an improved state. 
APPRAISAL EXPERIENCE QUALIFICATIONS AND A PARTIAL LIST OF CLIENTS: 
Real estate broker licensed by the State of Utah since January 1970. 
Association Manager and Designee Appraiser for the Federal Land Bank 
of Berkley (Cedar City Office) 1960 to 1965 
Indepent fee appraiser 1965 to present 
PARTIAL LIST OF CLIENTS: 
Review appraiser Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA #1099969) 
First Security Bank of Utah NA 
State Bank of Southern Utah 
Walker Bank and Trust 
Zion's First National Bank 
Utah State Road Commission 
Bureau of Public Roads 
National Park Service 
Federal Aviation Administration 
Internal Revenue Service 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
Cedar City Corporation 
St. George City 
Springdale City 
Kanab City 
Parowan City 
Salina City 
Iron County School District 
Sevier County School District 
Millard County School District 
Western Rock Products 
Attornies: 
Patric H. Fenton - Cedar City 
Willard Bishop - Cedar City 
Michael Park - Cedar City 
Joseph E. Jackson - Cedar City 
Ron Thompson - St. George 
Jim Scarth - St. George 
Michael Hughs - St. George 
Frank Allen - St. George 
Fay E. Reber - St. George 
Philip Long Foremaster - St. George 
J. Ralph Atkin - St. George 
I have been qualified as an expert witness in the appraisal field and 
testified in nine district courts in Utah and two in Nevada. 
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DEFINITION OF MARKET VALUE 
Market value is understood to be ". . .the highest price in terms of 
money which the property will bring in a competitive and open market 
under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and seller, 
each acting prudently, knowledgeably, and assuming the price is not 
affected by undue stimulus." 
Implicit in this definition is the consummation of sale as of a speci-
fied date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions 
whereby: 
1. buyer and seller are typically motivated. 
2. both parties are well informed or well advised, and each 
acting in what he considers his own best interest. 
3. a reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market. 
4. payment is made in cash or its equivalent. 
5. financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the 
community at the specified date and typical for the property 
type in its local. 
6. the price represents a normal consideration for the property 
sold unaffected by special amount and/or terms, services, 
fees, costs, or credits incurred in the transaction. 
DEFINITION OF HIGHEST AND BEST USE 
The highest and best use of land has been described as ". . . that 
reasonable and probable use that will support the highest present value 
as defined, as of the effective date of the appraisal. Alternatively, 
that use, from among reasonable, probable, and legal alternative uses 
found to be physically possible, appropriately supported, financially 
feasible, and which results in highest land value." ". . .It is to be 
recognized that in cases where a site has existing improvements on it, 
the highest and best use may yery well be determined to be different 
from the existing use. Implied within these definitions is recognition 
of the contribution of that specific use to community environment or to 
community development goals in addition to wealth maximization of indi-
vidual property owners. Also implied is that the determination of 
highest and best use results from the appraiser's judgement and analyti-
cal skill, i.e., that the use determined from analysis represents an 
opinion, not a fact to be found. In appraisal practice, the concept of 
highest and best use represents the premise upon which value is based. 
In the context of most probable selling price (market value) another 
appropriate term to reflect highest and best use would be most probable 
use. In the context of investment value, an alternative would be most 
profitable. 
Source: Real Estate Appraisal Terminology, compiled and edited by Byrl 
N. Boyce, PhD., jointly sponsored by the American Institute of Real 
Estate Appraisers and the Society of Real Estate Appraisers, published 
by Ballinger Publishing Company of Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
VALUE ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
The appraisal process is generally based on three approaches to 
value which, in turn, are based en various economic principles. The 
first approach is the reproduction cost approach. It begins with an 
estimate of the market value of the site, usually derived by direct 
comparison with sales of similar sites. Next, an estimate of the re-
production cost new of the building improvements is completed. From 
this is deducted depreciation which accrues from wear and. tear, chang-
ing standards of design and plan, and neighborhood defects. This de-
preciated value of the improvements is added to the estimate of site 
value, including the estimated contribution to value by site improve-
ments, to conclude the estimate of market value for the entire property. 
The primary justification for this approach is that a typical investor 
would not typically be willing to pay more for the subject property 
than it would cost him to produce a suitable substitute. 
The direct sales comparison or market approach estimates the 
market vaiur- of the subject property by comparing prices paid in the 
market for ^iTilar properties. The comparable sales are chosen from 
those recently sole! properties that would generally compete for the 
same investors in the market..' Comparison may be made of the whole 
comparable property to the subject, or of some element, such a? the 
ratio of gross income to sales price or the sales price per square 
foot, per room, or per some other unit of comparison. Then appro-
priate adjustments are made for any differences. From the soles 
prices or the adjusted sales prices of the comparable sales, the 
most probable selling price of the subject is estimated. Primary 
justification for the validity of this approach is that an investor* 
would not typically be willing to pay more for the subject property 
than it would cost him to purchase a suitable, existing substitute 
available in the market. 
The third approach is the capitalization or income approach. 
The application of this approach commences with an estimate of market 
rent and the appropriate expense ratio for the subject property. The 
expenses are deducted from the effective gross income to estimate the 
net operating income, which is capitalized into an estimate of market 
value by the use of appropriate rates developed in the market. These 
rates are bosed upon returns on and of capital investment typically 
required by investors in the market. One justification for this 
approach ic tort an investor would not typically pay more for the 
income stream produced by the subject r.han he would pay for a suitable 
substitute or. the marker. Further justification is that the market 
value of the rubject property is the present worth to the investor of 
ail of the future benefits (returns on and of equity investment) to 
be derived fr-vm holding title to the subject property. 
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Finally, these data are further considered in a reconciliation 
of the approaches and final estimate of value. Each of the three 
previously described approaches represents one of the three alter-
natives available to a typical investor in the real estate market. 
This is to say that a typical investor in the subject property may 
acquire a site and construct a suitable substitute; may go into the 
market and purchase a suitable existing substitute; or may acquire a 
suitable, competing, substitute investment that will generate a 
similarly acceptable return. These three approaches are then com-
eluded to be the most likely course of action for the subject pro-
perty, which becomes :he final estimate of value as of the date of 
the appraisal. 
ADDENDUM "E" 
AFFIDAVITS OF KENNETH ESPLIN AND D. BRUCE WHITED 
KEN CHAMBERLAIN [0608] 
OLSEN, McIFF & CHAMBERLAIN 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS 
76 SOUTH MAIN, P.O. BOX TOO 
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701 
TELEPHONE: 896-4461 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY, 
STATE Of UTAH 
( t k i i k » * 4 
HARRY THDRSFN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
MARKAY JOHNSON, et al., 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF KEN ESPLIN 
CONCERNING DAMAGES 
f.l vi I Nil Hnh GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, et. al„. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HARRY ri-lDRSKN HI hi I I M N A I M 
G A T E S , 
Def en : s , ) 
I I 4 « i « I t 
?TATF. OK I IT'AH I 
OUNTY OF IRON ) 
KEN ESPLIN, being first dulv sworn upm I Ii deposes 
I That he is I he witness, Ken Espli* '^stifled 
is iii cxpeii ni i he i .i\>\ i(mi rI rd'.i.j which wds '. e
 i
,tr!i 
and 2 7th days of August,, 198 2 in f he Sixth Judicial. District 
Court m and for Sevier Cnuni v. 
2. That he repeats the same background experience 
credentials and foundational statements he made as a basis foi 
and authorizing his expressing or testifying as to an opinioi 
concerning value of land, 
3. That as he testified in the captioned case at the 
time to trial he has inspected the real property known as the 
proposed Gooseberry Estates Subdivision. 
4. Using the same background, credentials anc 
experience to which he testified in the captioned case anc 
incorporating all the same by reference in this Affidavit he 
expresses the following opinions: 
(a) He reiterates the testimony that the real propertj 
subject of litigation consisting of approximately 50.9 acres was 
worth, without any improvements in* the year 1980 the sum of 
$1250.00 per acre. 
(b) That it is not economically feasible to develop 
the land as a subdivision or for any other purposes without a 
complete restoration of the soil, the surface, the vegetation (or 
at least a substantial degree of vegetation including trees) as 
would be required in order to develop the land for any purpose. 
(c) He is of the opinion that the highest and best use 
of the property in 1980 prior to the excavation made thereon by 
the defendant Harry Thorsen was as a subdivision or a mountain 
lot development. That was the highest and best use then and 
there were no other uses available for the land then except for 
(d) He ha.s n JW reviewed evidence of D Bruce Whited 
m a d e under odili, n£ the cost of restoring and t fie D h s t a c l e s to 
(' (> rn p 1 e f e r<ii s h H , 11* i < 111 m l i 111 • 11 h j i' i I p ir u |) e i L y « 11111 i s L I L t h 
upini-M i *E :he development thereof as -ubdivuion s no 
4.w4Sible, eifN>"
 rkv--* ^  • < 
i che opinion idu '. ..e property's ne\i -»a 
damage oone :o -endanc Harry Thor-e: , -' p£ 
ebiadt) 1988 ib tne sum t^ >^o ui. pe: j^ rt ^ j ~-a" .- afl< 
- value f ,u lauu C*L ——f fc * -1 
\ „. c- now or co1 - trv -r ion 
after the excavation made Ly —-*.? Thorsen. 
/s/ Ken Esplin
 m • 
Ken Esplm 
SUBSCRIBED A ND SWOR N to before me, a notary public, 
V i "i f F"' P "h "i I, l;:) "| u111 "1 Q ,fi ,R 
/s/ 
Notary Public 
, Utah 
"ommission Expires. 
ftfti& 
KEN CHAMBERLAIN [uouo, 
OLSEN, McIFF h CHAMBER!^ .N 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS 
76 SOUTH MAIN, P.O. BOX 100 
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84 701 
TELEPHONE: 896-A461 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY, 
S-:AI «: • r\H 
» * i » » i k A « 
HARRY THORSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARKAY JOHNSON, et al., 
Defendants. 
GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, et al., 
Fiamtiff s, 
vs. 
HARRY IHORSt N .mil WiNriUi 
GATES, 
Defendants. 
i ) 
: SS 
COUNTY ) 
I1 BRUCE WHITED, beinp fir 
deposes and says: 
Thar he is a d'^y licensed professional engineer having 
in ili.it profession sino.1 I'lbH II'1 is A graduate 
engineer from the University of Utah; and as a civil engineer was 
AFFIDAVIT CF 
D. BRUCE WHITED 
DTTCH RESTORATION COST 
AND SUMMARi 
Civil No. 8-61 
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President and Manager of Canyon Lands Engineering Corporation, a 
Richfield, Utah engineering firm; has been a civil engineei 
designing and supervising the construction of municipal water, 
sewer, street, highway, bridge and other infra-structural systems 
and has designed and supervised the construction of dams anc 
airports; that he is familiar with rules, regulations, ordinances 
in general or special laws related to all types of subdivisions. 
During the last twenty years he has supervised the development of 
mountain subdivisions, among them the types of development 
included in the captioned litigation, and has comprehensive 
knowledge concerning the economics of such endeavors. 
D. Bruce Whited makes the following statement under 
oath concerning the Gooseberry Estate Subdivision: 
I have physically inspected and know the past and 
present condition of the proposed mountain subdivision 
hereinafter described; have investigated the cost of restoring 
the land to a condition comparable to its condition before any 
unauthorized excavation or trenching of a ditch thereupon was 
made in approximately 1980 and effect thereof and the condition 
of said land if attempts are made to restore it to its former 
condition. 
DITCH RESTORATION COST AND SUMMARY 
PROJECT LOCATION: 
Gooseberry Estates Subdivision, Sevier County, Utah 
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INTRODUCTION: 
In o r d e r to determine the c o s t of t h i s , J l tc 
r e s t o r a t i o n i n ^ i e i f ^ f i r s t n e ^ e s s a r v n i-Jentxiy the *t>t 
1 .- • r ^ r -»! lv * e^tox 
tne •-tit'jfCt *rea n d - v i i s t u r b e d ond; t ion ic «%c 
d e f i n ; , .
 rt\ 
been des t royed and can nev t ; l u D . i c a i e c r e o l o j - -
SCOPE: For the pi l rpose f UUSL C&LIUIO imiuvl ih 
scope . .v , ,.., . r e « t o r a t i r i t - ea tc r~ ar 
o r i g i r a : e l e - i ' ; >r <• .1*1 mnrni r *. * - ^
 UL> inc lude an 
. * •-- s u i t a b . e ^ree g rcv tb 
nor does :• i r e s s any roedsure:* . i r e d camouflage the sea 
scupte doe* * e •?- ^*s - -1 . - , *<•* p r o p e r . y b a c k f j l 
a • : -^racc the excavdUu • • i 
maintenance t h a t wiLi be r e q u i r e d . 
CKNRH/M iMH • lMM: 
The o n - s i t t i n s p e c t i o n " t h e a r e a r evea led th< 
fo l low i n g i t e in s * L C U 11 c e r n : 
Jl . The wuik area i s confined and w i l l r e q u i r e cons iderable 
h a n (1 1 a h * •> r f 0 1: e s 10 r e I t p r 0 pe r l y , 
1" , Pi'opet (, ui'ib Lruct ion melhoiis and equipment s e l e c t i o n b] 
I 11 e o n t r a c t o r wi 11 be 1 1»cjuired 10 u 1 der -^ minimizi 
a dd 1 (' i, 11 n< 1 I »1.1 ma ge 1* I <l I 11 e H t e A . 
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There are numerous large rocks and tree debris thai 
cannot be incorporated in the backfill. This materia] 
will have to be removed from the site and properly 
disposed of. 
The soil conditions vary along the length of the 
excavation. In those areas where bedrock and heavj 
clays were encountered additional fill material will be 
required to provide a proper seedbed. 
The newly excavated ditch has created a drainage 
barrier along the entire length of the subdivision. 
Special preventive measures must be incorporated intc 
the restoration process to prevent storm water fron 
destroying the completed work. Loosely compacted soil 
in a confined excavation of this type is easily eroded 
if the ditch is not properly compacted. If erosion 
control structures are not installed, it is likely that 
a storm of moderate intensity would cause considerable 
damage to both the restored area as well as the lower 
adjacent property. 
COST ESTIMATE 
The cost to restore the excavation to its original 
and contour are: 
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No^ Item Cost 
!1 Bark f I'" 4 " ompac t ing $15,000 
2. - i .p 4 0 
:! Seedbed preparation 3,500 
4e Seed. 1,500 
^ Erosion control structure 2,500 
Supervise*-- -r- * ^ r:^tenance 5,000 
7. ., . . 3,200 
Total Cost 334,700 
ECONOMICS OF CONTINUING THE PROJECT UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS 
The present condition » :? :,..-*-4* 
. vidmg. T^P ne w CvN excavatic ^ e n a ft ex 
•estoraticr: ! i- .-.-. u n virtually impossible. Lo ^evelop the 
Fne r s g i \^ . u-'tl ;b J > L ' r * (, he I l lot s i s 
aaChaiig • ' ai. *J , £\J\J I ( l "J I;:1 1" 1 0 ' p i L t J 111 
m<zr<z ' ^nc fc ^ * .,<,. , UCUD i S b i o n s an / r e a l i z e a 
, ro f i r of rff <r , -« : „ ,
 r „ ^ww, w.**w c i v e r ^ e e s a l e s p r i c e n e e d s 
l ; : 1 • 5 3 2 , 0 0 0 i " " 1 : t . ' 
opini* ' " " ^fore *' t . ^xca.ation he 
majority of j 
-v j^ .' C >- '. L • " i : * J JL "? i, - I v * t; U 4 dCjdcent ^o r r*r- Meadow to sell 
for slightly Lionel amounts as LIICJ weie the Uit * --hip. 
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It is my opinion that because of the extensive 
excavation on the 11 previously undisturbed lots, 9 of whict 
border the Meadow, lot sales will not average $12,000. There are 
now 18 lots out of 33 lots which will have major, highly visible 
swaths cut through the center, or near center. The prime lots 
are no longer prime. In addition, even the undisturbed lots have 
been decreased in value because the general conditions anc 
overall aesthetics of the project have been adversely effected. 
In summary, the development costs (all fixed costs) 
have remained the same but the ability to make a profit frou 
subdividing the property no longer exists. The overall value of 
the project has been decreased by an amount equal to the 
projected minimum of profit. 
/s/ D. Bruce Whited 
D. Bruce Whited, P.E. 
License No. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a notary public, 
this day of February, 1988. 
Residing At: 
My Commission Expires: 
±U- Notary Public 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF -_Aw, AND JUDGMENT 
*™es"m 
£EN CHAMBERLAIN 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS JOHNSON 
AND PLAINTIFFS GOOSEBERRY ESTATF-S 
76 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701 
TELEPHONE: 896-4461 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY, 
HARRY THORSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
MARKAY JOHNSON and BRYCE 
JOHNSON, individually, and 
MARKAY JOHNSON and BRYCE 
JOHNSON dba GOOSEBERRY ESTATE: 
,i partnership, 
Defendants. 
GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, a 
partnership consisting of 
TOKACO ENTERPRISES (itself a 
family partnership consisting 
of William T. Gardner and his 
children William Todd Gardner, 
Kari Ann Gardner and Corrina 
Ann Gardner), LATIGO, INC., a 
corporation; TELL W. GARDNER; 
SadCfc 30¥^SO^-, ViKBS^ I 30TOSSO^  
and LEONARD V. ELFERVIG, all 
doing business as Gooseberry 
Estates, a Utah partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
) 
Civi, ;., . 84bi 
AMENDED FINDINGS 
OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Cv*i\ Yk>. %56tf 
HARRY THORSEN and DONALD GATES, ) 
DP t-'T'K.; W ' r 
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This matter came on regularly for non-jury trial on the 
26th, 27th and 31st days of August, 1982, before the Honorable 
Don V. Tibbs, District Judge, in the Courtroom of the Sevier 
County Courthouse at Richfield, Utah, Norman H. Jackson of 
Jackson, Mclff & Mower appearing in Civil No. 8461 for the 
Plaintiff, Harry Thorsen, and Ken Chamberlain appearing for the 
Defendant Gooseberry Estates and others and appearing for the 
Plaintiffs in Civil No. 8564 and Norman H. Jackson appearing as 
counsel for the Defendants in Civil No. 8564; and evidence, both 
oral and documentary, including exhibits having been offered and 
received and the Court having heard arguments by counsel on 
behalf of all parties and being fully advised in the premises, 
NOW FINDS: 
[Case No. 8461] 
1. The Plaintiff Harry Thorsen is entitled to judgment 
against Markay Johnson and Bryce Johnson, individually, and Marka] 
Johnson and Bryce Johnson dba Gooseberry Estates, a partnership, 
for damages in the amount of $240.00, resulting from their 
interference with Plaintiff's water rights and both ditches 
issuing, arising and flowing from the spring area located upon 
the following described lands in Sevier County, State of Utah: 
Commencing 443.49 feet North and 155.57 feet 
East from the Southwest Corner of Section 19, 
Township 22 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake 
Base & Meridian, and running thence North 
17°41f East 470 feet; thence North 37°02' 
West 208 feet; thence North 24°01' West 127 
feet; thence North 74°51! East 213 feet; 
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thence JUUUI ou J* £abl u u ieet; uhence 
South k\°k'V East 208 feet; thence South 
39°ir East 68 feet; thence South 53°01' East 
125 feet; thence South -V39' West 493 feet; 
thence North 82°45f *<sr 4fi^  fpe* *r 
beginning. 
' * t i t * i r ' t - **- - * • "1 h U 
^nu , . - ,ui ir]bon} i n d i v i d u a l l y ano Markay Johnson and Bryc e 
lohns r v Jl - r .ooseber™ F ^ t a r e ^ ^arfr.e1--1" 'n i 
.-i P'C *.,-.. . t "i wi:.eu a,ivi ; c s : r d i n e d ELOTI 
i n t e r f e r i n g wi~n m a i n t e n a n c e of a* : d e l i v e r v ,: wate»r f - r o u g b * i<*-
**v'** d i t c h e ^ r v - - r < . , , - . 
O m r t f i n d s * 1 a* -a,! o t h e r o b l i g a t i o n s - - *-
. -
r p r , . , „ , - e aifjJpj l e d \ v i ; 
«.dse No* roftu 
1 . xi j * ^ - i e n 
. . . , . . p i r ^ r , . ,, . . i4 a r t h . s e c t i o n s ^- n ^ 
Township 21 b< Kanee 2 E a s t , S a l f Lake M^*- =r ^ v e ^ i d i a r : 
* t- ^ * . s u n , *; 
s e l l i n g t d e p r o p e i i v dh s u b d i v i d e d m o u n t a i n ; o t s ; 
2 . The Cour* f'>•-*< -'• * • - n f e r ^ 
meetings where there were plats laid H .* showing how tb« or^r -
was being divide-1 • , \l -•-
actions, protested the Piciintii;- projected use oi cru property 
both through the Planning Commission oi Sevier County and iik^w se 
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when the Plaintiffs in this Civil action made application to 
change the point of diversion and place of use of their water 
rights for the subdivision; 
3. The Court finds that Plaintiff Gooseberry Estates, 
its partners and those whom they had engaged to survey the 
property above-described for the purpose of laying out lots all 
went over and across the property and when they examined the 
property no one found that there was in existence a "lower ditch,f 
and the Court finds that there had been a ditch anciently there 
but the ditch had not been used frequently and in fact had been 
used very infrequently, had been washed out in numerous places 
and lost its integrity as an irrigation ditch and for all 
practicable purposes it was not being used as an irrigation ditch 
for in excess of fifteen years; 
4. The Court finds that there was another ditch known 
as the "extension ditch" above the old ditch which, for all 
practicable purposes, had become the main irrigation ditch of the 
Gooseberry system which the Gooseberry Irrigation Company 
maintained and which delivered the water to the Thorsen premises; 
5. The Court finds that the Defendant in Civil No. 
8564, Harry Thorsen, retained the services of Mr, Donald Gates, 
the other Defendant, for the purpose of cleaning this ancient 
ditch and for purposes known only to himself, the said Harry 
Thorsen; but that the purposes for which he was repairing this 
sc 
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ditch were not valid purposes and particularly under these 
circumstances; 
6 . 1 • -Kf \,v«.: • ILI.O;..: ; r.d L :;:;^  -^rendan:. :: » . norsen anc 
bis contractor went on the propertv of the Oooseberrv Estates 
i
" A r T r . • • - :,! •- - - u 4 
^LI:\ :;..-I!- cu»< -:.J? Harry Thorseii *iLi£uLiy an. J: :.nrionai y 
used, under [aim if ri^br ' h- ^ r p r t ' ] n i 7' to &c in aijd 
'•-e:i- ;.; .eo:, A. rnQ.c; fhp premises 
LI the Gooseberrv Estates partnership; 
7. ' . -
examined anu inspected me- u L C * h throughout its iength a <d 
breadth and L- M" the opinion that the effect of olp-ning this 
is a trench ana tne un.jrt is shocked at "re carnage whici was done 
*u t> premises of * u*.' f*'^;-ehfrr; r-~ 
".»^r*
 4c grave d<.... 1 whei .:t: wi ^ ;. L.k property ; i e 
Gooseberry Estates partnership can ever be • ^ d * * * ^uroo'-e 
- 'n- -* • 
. .i-T' n'nd^ r --^  »• - n*. lc"..pr dicch &nculd not 
: •. L L:.~;- .. t was and , : Lhere 
1*. ad bf-,r* cirv r. \ at a,; T:* would have been "he right f runr. i^e 
a { V through Lue ar Lhe r:t?Ui -» • 
anc i w. ,. ., VIQTTP delivered mcic *.-, -. L under th^ cireumstanc-s 
then it will at the present time; 
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9. The Court finds that the Defendant Harry Thorsen 
conducted this activity upon his own; that he did not consult with 
the Gooseberry Irrigation Company and was not directed by the 
Irrigation Company so to act and that Harry Thorsen, in essence, 
was taking his own water under his rights and that he did the 
heavy equipment work in this way for the direct purpose of 
injuring the Plaintiffs (in Civil action No. 8564). The Court 
finds that the only purpose it, the Court, can determine was to 
have the luxury of an extra ditch which the Court finds is 
senseless under the circumstances in considering the use of Harry 
Thorsen1s neighbors1 premises; 
10. The Court likewise finds that the Defendant Harry 
Thorsen did not clean the ditch on his own land and did not clean 
the ditch in such a way that the ditch had any value. The Court 
in examining the premises went up to the where the cleaning 
commenced and it is the opinion of the Court that less than half 
of one second foot of water could have gone over or through the 
ditch; 
11. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs in Civil No. 
8564 have been damaged. The Court finds that there were nine (9) 
lots which were totally destroyed and the Court fixes the value 
of $6,000.00 per lot in their condition at the time of the 
aforesaid events and not in the condition they would have become 
upon full development but rather upon the basis of improvements 
done upon those lots up to the time the Defendant (in this second 
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action*, Harry Thorsen, conducted the excavation W O I K described 
hereinabove and that the Plaintiffs have bee^ ^ina^-'; J-' "»?g-: -:.o 
-.:*«•• - M. r - • - *. iv:gmer:t ot - r or 
damages; that the Pigment should he anct i, awarded against the 
Defender • r • ",( - .. JJ^- ; 
Detenaant. uoiia.c udieb Lor l.-t- :edSon that -. .ontract^: rust re .v 
upon the perso* emploving him 
lowing: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
C -2 h ;-1 . iiie P i ' 
partnership, are entii. Jtro to ;ucigmeni against the Deiendam !M 
that i". v\ 1 acticr :i.ir:N Thorsen in the amount of C:Su O^ 'V JO 
together with interest I rum August II , - at the rate of twel ve 
(12%) per cent; per annum. 
2. The r—r- M n d s th* ">':- • : -* N.. 
^ p i.,^et.. .,dinti: x.. w,,c:L dci iv 
of S2--*'" \t .• and iudgment should he entered according 
le amount 
injunction restraining Markay Johnson and fry^» Johnson, 
individually, and Markay Johnson and Bryce Johnson dKi ''-ooseberry 
describe J in tne Complain' u Livi /. £-*bl . 
DATED d ^ s ^ ~ * ^ ^ 
" V — 
"^S^RI^t JUDGE 
^V!CR COUNTY 
r.:n:: •"•::"•• « f r ^ £ 
IS32 DEC 22 k\\\\'-Sk 
IK THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY,. 
-••••;; :i-:'jL" ~ N . C L ^ : V 
STATE OF UTAH '-;/?i^ n^-c>V: ''' 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * l ^ ' /Z0-p-WL4^ 
HARRY THORSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
MARKAY JOHNSON and BRYCE 
JOHNSON, individually, and 
MARKAY JOHNSON and BRYCE 
JOHNSON dba GOOSEBERRY ESTATES 
a partnership, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 8564 
GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, a 
partnership consisting of 
TOKACO ENTERPRISES (itself a 
family partnership consisting 
of William T. Gardner and his 
children William Todd Gardner, 
Kari Ann Gardner and Corrina 
Ann Gardner), LATIGO, INC., a 
corporation; TELL W. GARDNER; 
BRYCE JOHNSON; MARKAY JOHNSON 
and LEONARD V. ELFERVIG, all 
doing business as Gooseberry 
Estates, a Utah partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
HARRY THORSEN and DONALD GATES, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
This matter came on regularly for non-jury trial on the 
26th, 27th and 31st days of August, 1982, before the Honorable 
:'or V Tibbs, District Judge, in the Courtroom of the Sevier 
County Courthouse at Richfield, Utaf „ Norman H. Jackson of 
Civil No. 8461 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
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Jackson, Mclff & Mower appearing in Civil No. 8461 for the 
Plaintiff, Harry Thorsen, and Ken Chamberlain appearing for the 
Defendant Gooseberry Estates and others and appearing for the 
Plaintiffs in Civil No. 8564 and Norman H. Jackson appearing as 
counsel for the Defendants in Civil No. 8564; and evidence, both 
oral and documentary, including exhibits, having been offered and 
received; and the Court having heard arguments by counsel on 
behalf of all parties and being fully advised in the premises, 
NOW, THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiffs 
in Civil No. 8564 Gooseberry Estates partnership are hereby 
granted judgment against Harry Thorsen in the amount of 
$54,000.00 minus $240.00 awarded in Civil Action No. 8461 for a 
net judgment of $53,760.00 which judgment shall bear interest at 
the rate of twelve (12%) per cent per annum from August 31, 1982. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Markay Johnson and Bryce 
Johnson, individually, and Markay Johnson and Bryce Johnson dba 
Gooseberry Estates, a partnership, the Defendants in the first 
civil action are hereby perpetually enjoined and restrained from 
interfering with the maintenance of and passage of water along the 
ditches described in Paragraph 1 of the Findings of Fact in Civil 
No. 8461. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the ________ day of 
, 1989, I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, postage prepaid, to: 
Ken Chamberlain 
76 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 100 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
31 
